434 LOGIC: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. yield our judgment to every plausible appearance. It is no pact of civility or good breeding to part with truth, but to maintain it with decency and candour. A spirit of contradiction is so pedantic and hateful, that a man should take much pains with himself to watch against every instance of it : he should learn so much good humour, at least, as never to oppose any thing without just and solid reason for it : he should abate some degrees of pride and moroseness, which are never - failing ingredients in this sort of temper, and should seek after so much honesty and conscience, as never to contend for con- quest or triumph ; but to review his own reasons, and to read the arguments of his opponents (if possible) with an equal indiffer- eucy, and be glad to spy truth, and to submit to it, though it ap- pear on the opposite side. (2.) There is another pair of prejudices derived from two tempers of mind, near a -kin to those I have just mentioned ; and these are the dogmatical and the sceptical humour, that is, always positive, or always doubting. By what means soever the dogmatist came by his opinions, whether by senses or by his fancy, his education or his own read- ing, yet he believes them all with the same assurance that he does a mathematical truth ; he has scarce any mere probabilities that helong to him ; every thing with him is certain and it fallible ; every punctilio in religion is an article of his faith, and he an- swers all manners of objections by a sovereign contempt. Persons of this temper are seldom to be convinced of any mistake': a full assurance of their own notions makes all the dif- ficulties on their own side vanish so entirely, that they think every point of their belief is written as with sun - beams, and wonder any one should find a difficulty in it. They are amazed that learned men should make a controversy of what is to them so perspicuous and indubitable. The lowest rank of people, both in learned and in vulgar life, is very subject to this obstinacy. Scepticism is a contrary prejudice. The dogmatist is sure of every thing, and the sceptic believes nothing. Perhaps he has found himself often mistaken in matters of which he thought himself well assured in his younger days, and therefore he is afraid to give assent to any thing again. IIe sees so much shew of reason for every opinion, and so many objections also arising against every doctrine,, that he is ready to throw off the belief of ever thing : he renounces at once the pursuit of truth, and con- tents himself to say, there is nothing certain. It is well, if through the influence of such a temper he does not cast away his religion as well as his philosophy, and abandon himself to a profane course of life, regardless of hell or heaven. Both these prejudices last mentioned, though they are so apposite to each other, yet they arise from the same spring, and
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