448 LOGIC : OR, THE RUGHT HIE or REASOIt. Yet let it be observed also, that so far as any person is ca. pable of forming and correcting his notions, and his rules of conduct in the natural, civil and religious life, by the strict rules of Logic; and so far as he hath time and capacity to review his old opinions, to re- examine all those which are any ways doubt- ful, and to determine nothing without just evidence, lie is likely to become so much the wiser and the happier man, and if divine grace assist him, so much the better christian. And though this cannot be done all at once, yet it may be done, by prudent steps and degrees till our whole set of opinions and principles be in time corrected and reformed, or at least established upon juster foundations. II. Direct. " Endeavour that all your ideas of those ob- jects, concerning which you pass any judgment, be clear and distinct, complete, comprehensive, extensive and orderly, as far as you have occasion to judge concerning them." 'This is the substance of the last chapter of the first part of Logic. The tules which direct our conceptions must be reviewed, if we would form our judgments aright. Bat if we will make haste to judge at all adventures, while our ideas are dark and con- fused, and very imperfect, we shall be in danger of running into many mistakes. This is like a person who would pretend to give the sum total of a large account in arithmetic, without surveying all the particulars ; or as a painter, who professes to draw a fair and distinct landscape in the twilight, when he can hardly distin- guish a house from a tree. Observe here, That this direction does not require us to gain clear, distinct, complete ideas of things in all their parts, powers and qualities, in an absolute sense : for this belongs to God alone, and is impossible for us to attain : but it is expressed in a relative or limited sense ; that is, our ideas should be clear, distinct, and comprehensive, &c. at least so far as we have occa- sion at that time to judge concerning them. We may form many true and certain judgments concerning God, angels, animals, men, heaven, hell, &c. by those partial and very imperfect con- ceptions of them to which we have attained, if we judge no far- ther concerning them than our conceptions reach. We may have a clear and distinct idea of the existence of many things in nature, and affirm that they do exist, though our ideas of their intimate essences and causes, their relations and Manners of actions, are very confused and obscure. We may judge well concerning several properties of any being, though Other properties are unknown ; for perhaps we know not all the properties of any being whatsoever. Sometimes we have clear ideas of the absolute properties of in object: and we may judge of them with certainty, while the lelative properties are very obscure and unknown to us. So wo
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