CHAPTER IV. 449 may have a clear and just idea of the area of a parallelogram, without knowing what relation it bears to the area of a tri- angle or a polygon; I may know the length of a diameter of a circle ; without knowing what proportion it has to the circum- ference. There are other things, whose external relative properties, with respect to each other, or whose relation to us, we know better than their own inward and absolute properties, or their essential distinguishing attributes. We perceive clearly, that fire will warm or burn us, and will evaporate water; and that water will allay our thirst, or quench the fire, though we know not the inward distinguishing particles, or prime essential pro- perties of fire or water. We may ltnow the King and Lord Chancellor, and affirm many things of them in their legal rho- racters, though we can have but a confused idea of their persons or natural features, if we have never seen their faces, So the scripture hat revealed God himself to us, as our Creator, Pre- server, Redeemer, and Sanct£er, and as the object of our wor- thip, in clearer ideas than it has revealed many Ritter abstruse questions which may be raised about bis own divine essence or substance, his immensity, or omnipresence, This therefore is the general observation in order to guide our judgments, that « we should not allow ourselves to form a judgment concerning things farther than our clear and distinct ideas reach," autel then we are not in danger of error. But there is one considerable objection against this rule, which is necessary to be answered ; and there is one just and reasonable exception, which is as needful to be mentioned. The objection is this : May we not judge safely concerning some total or complete ideas, when we have a clear perception only of some parts or properties of them ? May we not affirm that all that is in God is eternal, or that all his unknown attributes are infinite, though we have so very imperfect an idea of God, eternity and infinity ? Again, may we not safely judge of particular objects, whose idea is obscure, by a clear idea of the general ? May I not affirm, that every unknown species of animals leas inward springs of motion; because I have a clear idea that these inward springs belong to an animal in general. Answer. All those supposed unknown parts, properties or species, are clearly and distinctly perceived to be connected with, or contained in the known parts, properties, or general ideas, which we suppose to be clear and distinct as far as we judge of them : and as we have no particular idea of those unknown di- vine attributes, or unknown species, of animals ; so there is nothing particular affirmed concernirgthem beyond what belongs VOL. VII. - F F
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