CHAPTER IV. 451 God's revealing them, or that they are contained in scripture; and this is sufficient evidence to determine our assent. The same thing holds true in some measure, where cre- dible human testimony assures us of some propositions, while we have no sufficient ideas of the subject and predicate of them to determine our assent. Su when an honest and learned mathematician assures a ploughman that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, or that the square of the hypothenuse of a right - angled triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of the two sides; the ploughman who has but con- fused ideas of these things, may firmly and safely believe these propositions, upon the same ground, because he has evidence of the skill and faithfulness of his informer*. s: Perhaps some may object against this representation of things, and say, that " We cannot properly be said to believe a proposition any farther than we ourselves have ideas under the term; therefore if we have no Ideas under the terms, we believe nothing but the connexion of words or sounds; and if we have but obscure and inadequate ideas under the terms, then we partly believe a con- nexion of things, and partly a connexion of sounds. But that we cannot pro- perly be said to believe the proposition, for our faith can never go beyond our ideas." Now to set this matter in a clear light. I suppose that every proposition which is proposed to my assent, is a sentence made up of terms which have some ideas under them known or unknown to me. I confess, if I believe there are no ideas at all under the terms, and there is nothing meant by them, then indeed, with regard to me, it is the mere " joining of sounds ;" but if, for instance, a ploughman has credible information from as honest and skilful mathemetician, that an " elipsis is made by the section of a cone," he believes the proposition, or he believes the sentence is true, as it is made up of terms which his informant understands, though the ideas be unknown to him ; that is, he believes there are some ideas which his informant has under these words which are really connected. And I think, this may justly be called believing the proposition, for it is a be- lief of something more than the mere joining of sounds ; it is a belief of the real connection of some unknown ideas belonging to those sounds, and in this sense a man may be said to believe the truth of a proposition, which he doth not understand at all. With more reason still may we be said to believe a proposition upon credi- ble testimony, if we have some sort of ideas under the terms, though they are but partial, or inadequate and obscure; such as " divine answerswere given by Urim and Thummim ;" for since it is purely upon testimony, we believe the " known parts" of the ideas signified by those words to be connected, upon the same testimony we may also believe all the " unknown parts" of the ideas signi- fied by those words to be connected, namely, because our informant is knowing and faithful. And in this sense we may justly be said to believe a proposition of scripture entirely, which we understand but very imperfectly, because God who reveals it is knowing and faithful in perfection. And indeed, unless this representation of the matter be allowed, there are but very few propositions in the world, even in human things, to which we can give an entire assent, or which we may be said either to know or to believe, be- game there is scarce any thing on earth of which we have an adequate, and most perfect idea. And it is evident, that in divine things there is scarce any thing which we could either know or believe without this allowance : for though reason and revelation join to inform me, that " God is holy," how exceeding inadequate are my ideas of God, and of his holiness i' Yet I may boldly and entirely assent to this whose proposition, since 1 am sure that every known and unknown idea signified by the terra " God," is connected with the ideas of the term "holiness,' pf2
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