452 LOGIC : Oit, T(Ir, RIG1 T USE OF REASON. III. Direçt. When you have obtained as, Clear and cam- prehensive ideas as needful, both of the subject and predicate of a proposition, then "compare those ideas of the subject and predicate together with the utmost attention, and observe how far they agree, and wherein they differ: Whether the pro- position may be affirmed absolutely or relatively, whether in whole or in part, whether universally or particularly, and then under what particular limitations. Turn these ideas about in your mind, and take a view of them on all sides, just as a mason Would do to see whether two hewn stones exactly suit each other in every part, and are fit to be joined in erecting a carved or fluted pillar. Compare the whole subject with the whole predicate in their several parts : take heed in this matter that you neither add to nor diminish the ideas contained in the subject or in the predi- cate ; for such an inadvertence or mistake will expose you to great error in judgment. because reason partly informs me, but especially because the divine testimony which has connected them, is certainly credible. I might segue upon this bead perhaps more forcibly from the doctrine, of " God's incomprehensibleness." If we could believe nothing but what we have ideas of, it would be impossible for as to believe that i° God is incomprehensi- ble;" for this implies in it a belief that there are some unknown ideas beloagiug to the nature of God ; therefore we do both believe and profess something concerniug ábknowo ideas, when we believe and profess that God is incompre, hensible. persuade myself that most of those very persons who object against my rtpreseutatioe of things, will yet readily confess they believe all the propositions in scripture, rather than deçlare " they do not believe several of them ;" though they most acknowledge that several of them ere far above their understanding, or that they have scarce any ideas of the true sense of them ; end therefore where propositions derived from credible testimony are made up of dark or in- adequate ideas, I think it is much more proper to, say, we believe them, than that we do not believe them, lest we cut off a multitude of the propositions of the bible frym our assent of faith. Yet let it be observed here, that when we believe a proposition on mere tee - timouy, of which we have po idepe at all, we can only he said to give. a "general implicit assent to the truth of that proposition" without any particular knowledge of, or " explicit assent to the special troth contained in that proposition :" qpd this our implicit assent is of very little use, unless it lee to testify our belief of the knowledge and veracity of himthat informs. us, As our ideas of a proposition are more or less clear and adequate, as well as just and proper, so we do explicitly assent more or less to the particular truth cnutained in that proposition; and our assent hereby becomes more or less useful for the increase of our knowledge, or the direction of our practice. When divine testimony plainly proposes to our faith such aproposition where- of we have but obscure, doubtful and inadequate ideas, we are hotted implicitly to believe the truth cf it, as expressed in these terme, in order to skew our sub- mission to God who revealed it, as a God of perfect knowledge and veracity. But it is our duty to use all proper methods to obtain a farther and explicit knowledge of the particular truth contained in the proposition, if we would im- prove by it either in knowledge or virtue. All necessary rules of grammar and criticism should be employed to find out the very ideas that belong to those words, and which were designed by the divine rpeeker or writer. Though we may be. lieve the truth of a proposition which we do not understand, yet we should en -' deavour to understand every proposition which we believe to be true.
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