CHAPTER V. 48I practice; there are peculiar rules which relate to things practical, whether they be matters of religion, morality, or prudence i yet many things in this section may be applied to practical enquiries and matters of faith, though it chiefly relates to knowledge, and speculations of reason. I. Whatsoever clear ideas we can join together without in, consistency, are to b.e counted possible, because almighty power can make whatsoever we can conceive. 2. From the mere possibility of a thing we cannot infer its actual existence; nor from the non- existence of it can we infer its impossibility. Note, The idea of God seems to claim an exemption from this general rule: for if he be possible, he certainly exists, be- cause the very idea includes eternity, and he cannot begin to be : if he exist not, he is impossible, for the very same reason. 3. Whatsoever is evidently contained in the idea of any thing, may be affirmed of that thing with certainty. Reason is contained in the idea of a man ; and existence is contained in the idea of God ; and therefore we may affirm God exists, and maw is reasonable. 4. It is impossible that the same thing should be, and not be at the same time and in the same respect. Thence it follows, that two 00 contradictory ideas cannot be joined in the same part of the same subject, at the same time, and in the same respects : or, that two contradictory propositions can never be both true." 5. The more we converse with any subject in its various properties, the better knowledge of it we are likely to attain ; and by frequent and repeated enquiries and experiments, reasonings and conversations about it, we confirm our true judgments of that thing, and correct our former mistakes. 6.: Yet after our utmost enquiries, we can never be assured by reason, that we know all the powers and properties of any finite being. 7. If, finite beings are not adequately known by us, much less the things infinite ; for it is of the nature of. a finite mind not to he able to comprehend what is infinite. 8. We may judge and argue very justly and certainly con- cerning infinities, in some parts of them, or so far as our ideas reach, though the infinity of them bath something incomprehen- sible in it. And this is built on the general rule following, namely,. 9. Whatsoever is sufficiently clear and evident, ought not to be denied, though there are other things belonging to the same subject, which cannot be comprehended. I may affirm many things with certainty concerning human souls, their union with bodies, concerning the divisibility of matter, and the attributes of God, though many other things relating to them are all dark- ness to us.
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