462 LOGIC : OR, TIIE arch i TISE or REASOtt. JO. If any opinion proposed has either no arguments, of equal arguments for and against it, we must remain in perfect suspence about it, till convincing evidence appear on one side. 11. 'Where present necessity of action does not constrain us to determine, we should not immediately yield up our assent to mere probable arguments, without a due reserve, if we have any reasonable hope of obtaining greater light and evidence on one side or the other : for when the balance of the judgment once resigns "its equilibrium or neutrality to a mere probable argument, it is too ready to settle itself on that side, so that the mind will not easily change that judgment though bright and strong evidence appear afterwards on the other side. 12. Of two opinions, if one has unanswerable difficulties attending it, we must not reject it immediately, till we examine whether the contrary opinion has not difficulties as unanswerable. 13. If each opinion has objections against it which we can- not answer, or reconcile, we should rather embrace that which has the least difficulties in it, and which has the best arguments to support it : and let our assent bear proportion to the superior evidence. 14. If any doctrine bath very strong and sufficient light and evidence to command our assent, we should not reject it because there is an objection or two against it which we are not able to answer ; for upon this foot a common christian would be baffled out of -every article of his faith, and must renounce even the dic- tates of his reason and his senses ; and the most learned man per- haps would hold but very few of them fast : for some objections which attend the sacred doctrine of the eternity and the omnipre- sence of God, and the philosophical doctrines of light, atoms, space, motion, &c. are hardly solvable to this day. 15. Where two extremes are proposed, either in matters of speculation or practice, and neither of them has certain and con- vincing evidence, it is generally safest to take the middle way. Moderation is more likely to conic near the truth than doubtful extremes. This is an excellent rule to judge of the characters and value of the greatest part of persons and things ; for nature sel- dom deals in superlatives. It is a good rule also by which to form our judgment in many speculative controversies ; a reconciling medium in such cases does often best secure truth as well as peace. 16. When two different propositions have each a very strong and cogent evidence, and do not plainly appear inconsistent, we may believe both of them, though we cannot at present see the way to reconcile them. Reason as well as our own consciousness, assures us, that the will of man is free, and that multitudes of human actions are in that respect contingent ; and yet reason and scripture assure us, that God forelatows them all, and this implies
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