CHAPTER V. 463 a certain fatality. Now though learned men have not to this day hit on any so clear and happy method as is desired to reconcile these propositions, yet since we do not see a plain inconsistency in them, we justly believe them both, because their evidence is great. 17. Let us not therefore too suddenly determiné in difficult matters, that two things are utterly inconsistent, for there are many propositions which may appear inconsistent at first, and yet afterwards we find their consistency, and the way of reconciling them may be made plain and easy ; as also there are other pro- positions which may appear consistent at first, but after due exami- nation we find their inconsistency. 18. For the same reason we should not call those difficulties utterly insolvable, or those objections unanswerable, which we are not presently able to answer : time and diligence may give farther light. 19. In short, if we will secure ourselves from error, we should not be too frequent or hasty in asserting the certain consist - ency or inconsistency, the absolute universality, necessity, or im- possibilty of things, where there is not the brightest evidence. He is but a young and raw philosopher, who, when he sees two particular ideas evidently agree, immediately asserts them to agree universally, to agree necessarily, and that it is impossible it should be otherwise. Or when he sees evidently that two particular ideas happen to disagree, he presently asserts their constant and natural inconsistency, their utter impossibility of agreement, and calls every thing contrary to his opinion absurdity and nonsense. A true philosopher will affirm or deny with much caution and modesty, unless he has thoroughly examined and found the evi- dence of every part of his assertion exceeding plain. 20. Let us have a care of building our assurance of any im- portant point of doctrine upon one single argument, if there are more to be obtained. We should not slight and reject all other arguments which support the same doctrine, lest if our favourite argument should be refuted, and fail us, we should be tempted to abandon that important principle of truth. I think this was a very culpable practice in Descartes, and some of his followers, who when he had found out the argument for the existence of God, derived from the idea of a most pefect and self -existent being, he seemed to despise and abandon all other arguments against atheism. 21. If we happen to lave our chief arguments for any opinion refuted, we should not immediately give up the opinion itself ; for perhaps it may be a truth still, and we may find it to be justly supported by other arguments, which we might once think weaker, or perhaps by new arguments which we knew not before. 22. We ought to esteem that to be sufficient evidence of a
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