464 LOGIC : OE, THE RIGHT USE OF 5555015. some other proposition is proved to be true which is less probable, and thence it follows that the original proposition is true, because it is'more probable. This is an argument ex' minus probabili ad magis. (3.) When any other proposition is proved, upon which it was before agreed to yield the original question. This is an ar- gument en concesso. V. 'There is yet another rank of arguments which have Latin names ; their true distinction is derived from the topics or middle terms which are used in them, though they are called an address to our judgment, our faith, our ignorance, our profession our modesty, and our passions. 1. If an argument be taken from the nature or existence of things, and addressed to the reason of mankind it is called argu- mentum ad judicium. When it is borrowed from some convincing testimony, it is argumentunsadfideum, an address to our faith. 3. When it is drawn from any insufficient medium whatso- ever, and yet the opposer has not skill to refute or answer it, this is argumentum ad ignorantiam, an address to our ignorance. 4. When it is built upon the professed principles or opinions of the persons with whom we argue, whether the opinions be true: or false, it is named argumentum ad hominem, an address to our professed principles. St. Paul often uses this argument when he reasons with the Jews, and when he says, 1 speak as a Haan. 5. When the argument is fetched from the sentiments of some wise, great, or good men, whose authority we reverence and hardly dare oppose, it is called argumentum ad verecuadiam, an address to our modesty. 6. I add finally, When an argument is borrowed from any topics which are. suited to engage the inclinations, and passions of the hearers on the side of the speaker, rather than to convince the judgment, this is argumentum ad passiones, an address to the passions ; or if it be made publicly, it is called ad populurn, or an appeal to the people. After all these divisions of syllogisms or arguments arisingfioln the middle term, there is one distinction proper to be mentioned which arises from the premises. An argument is called uniform, when both the premises are derived from the saine spring of knowledge, whether it be sense, reason, consciousness, human faith, or divine faith : but when the two premises are derived from different springs of knowledge, it is called a mixt argument. Whether the conclusion must be called human or divine, when one or both premises are matters of divine faith, but the conclu- sion is drawn by human reason, I leave to be disputed and deter- mined iu the schools of theology.
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