CI APTPR., III. . 486 Thus the second chapter is finished, and a particular account given of all the chief kinds of syllogisms or arguments which are made use of among men, or treated of in Logic, together with special rules for the-formation of them, as far as is necessary. If a syllogism agrees with the rules which are given for the construction and regulation of it, it is called 'a true argument : if it disagrees with these rules, it is a paralogism Or false argu- ment : but when a false argument puts on the face and appearance of a true one, then it is properly called a sophism or fallacy, which shall be the subject of the next chapter CHAP. III.The Doctrine of Sophisms. FROM truth nothing can really follow but what is true whensoever therefore we find a false conclusion drawn from pre- mises which seem to be true, there must be some fault in the de- duction or inference ; or else one of the premises is not true in the sense in which it is used in that argument. When an argument carries the face of truth with it, and yet leads us into mistake, it is a sophism ; and there is some need of a particular description of these fallacious arguments, that we may with snore ease and readiness detect and solve them. SECT, I. -Of several Kinds of Sophisms, and their Solution: AS the rules of right judgment, and of good ratiocination, often coincide with each other, so the doctrine ofprejudices, which was treated of in the second part of Logic, has anticipated a great deal of what might be said on the subject 'of .sophisms ; yet I shall mention the most remarkable springs of false argumentation, which are reduced by logicians to some of the following heads. I. The first sort of sophism is called ignoratio elenchi, or a mistake of the question ; that is, when something else is proved which has neither any necessary connexion or consistency with the thing enquired, and consequently gives no determination to the enquiry, though it may seem at first sight to determine the question as, if any should conclude that St. Paul was not a native Jew, by proving that he was born a Roman or if they should pretend to determine that he was neither Roman nor Jew, by proving that he was born at Tarsus in Cilicio, these sophisms are refuted by shewing that all these three may be true ; for he was born of Jewish parents in the city of Tarsus, and by spme peculiar privilege granted to his parents, or his native city, he was born a denizen of Rome. Thus there is neither of these three characters of the apostle inconsistent with each other, and therefore the proving one of them true does not refute the others. Or if the question be proposed, Whether the excess of wine
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