SOO LOGIC: O!, THE RIGHT PSE OF REASON. tinction ; as, if any one should reason thus ; All the musical instruments of the Jewish temple made a noble concert ; the harp was a musical instrument of the Jewish temple ; therefore the harp macle a noble concert. Here the word all in the major is collective, whereas such a conclusion requires that the word all 'should be distributive. It is the saine fallacy when the universal word all or no refers to species hi one proposition, and to individuals in another; as, All animals were in Noah's ark; therefore no animals pe- rished in the flood ; whereas in the premise all animals signifies every kind of animals, which does not exclude or deny the drowning of it thousand individuals. VIII. The last sort of sophisms arises from our abuse of the ambiguity of words, which is the largest and most extensive 'kind Of fallacy ; and indeed several of the former fallacies might be reduced to this head. When the words or phrases are plainly equivocal, they are called sophisms of equivocation ; as if we should argue thus : I {e that sends forth a bookinto the light desires it to be read ; he that throws a book into the fire, sends it into the light ; therefore he that throws a book into the fire desires it to be read. This sophism, as well as the foregoing, and all of the like nattire, are solved by sheaving the different senses of the words, terms or phrases. Here light in the major proposition signifies the public view of the world ; in the minor it "signifies the bright- ness of flame and .fire ; and therefore the syllogism has ]four terms, or rather it has no middle term, and proves nothing. But where such gross equivocations and ambiguities appear in arguments, there is little danger of imposing upon ourselves or others. The greatest danger, and which we are perpetually exposed to in reasoning, is, where the two senses or signifies- tions of one term are near'a -kin, and not plainly distinguished, and yet they are really sufficiently different in their sense to lead us into great mistakes, if we are not watchful. And indeed the "greatest part of controversies in the sacred or civil life, arise from the different senses that are put upon words, and the differ- ent ideas which are included in them; as have been shewn at large in the first part of Logic, Chap. 1'V. which treats of words and terms. There is after all these, another sort of sophism which is wont to be called an imperfect enumeration or a false induction, when from a few experiments or observations men inter general theorems and universal propositions. But this is sufficiently no- ticed in the foregoing chapter, where we treated of that sort of syllogism which is called induction.
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy OTcyMjk=