506 LOGIC: OR, THE RIGHT t73'ß OF REASON. responses and determinations, which some have obtruded in- stead of solutions and solid answers, before they perfectly knew the question. IV. " When you have exactly considered the precise point of enquiry, or what is unknown in the question, then consider what, and how much you know already of this question, or of the ideas and terms of which it is composed." It is by a com- parison of the known and unknown parts of the question together, that you find what reference the part known bath unto, or what connections it bath with the thing that is sought : those ideas, whereby the known and unknown parts of the question are con- nected, will furnish you with middle terms or arguments whereby the things proposed may be proved or disproved. In this part of your work, namely, comparing ideas toge: ther, take due time, and be not too hasty to come to a determi- nation, especially in points of importance. Some men when they see a little agreement or disagreement between ideas, they presume a great deal, and so jump into a conclusion. This is a short way to fancy, opinion and conceit, but a most unsafe and uncertain way to true knowledge and wisdom. V. "In choosing your middle terms or argument to prove any question, always take such topics as are surest and least falli- ble, and which carry the greatest evidence and strength with them." Be not so solicitous about the number, as the weight of your arguments, especially in proving any proposition which ad- mits of natural certainty, or of complete demonstration. Many times we do injury to a cause by dwelling upon trifling argu- mente. We amuse our hearers with uncertainties, by multiply- ing the number of feeble reasonings, before we mention those which are more substantial, conclusive, and convincing. And too often we yield up our own assent to mere probable argu- ments, where certain proofs may be obtained. Yet it must be confessed there are many cases wherein the growing number of probable arguments increases the degree of probability, and gives a great and sufficient confirmation to the truth which is sought; as, (1.) When we are enquiring the true sense of any word or phrase, we are more confirmed in the signification of it, by find- ing the same expression so used in several authors, or in several places of the same author. (2.) When we are searchingout the true meaning or opinion of any - writer, or enquiring into any sacred doctrine of scripture, we come to.a surer determination of the truth by several distinct places wherein the same thing is expressed or plainly implied ; because it is not so probable that an honest skilful reader should mistake tile meaning of the writer in many places, as he may in one or two.
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