CHAPTER IV. 507: (3.) When we would prove the importance of any scriptu- ral doctrine or duty, the multitude of texts, wherein it is re, peated and inculcated upon the reader, seems naturally to instruct us that it is a matter of greater importance, than other things which are but slightly or singly mentioned in the Bible. (4.) In searching out matters of fact in times past, or in distant places, in which case moral evidence is sufficient, and moral certainty is the utmost which can be attained, here we derive a greater assurance of the truth of it by a number of persons, or a multitude of circumstances concurring to bear witness to it. (5.) From many experiments in natural philosophy, we more safely infer a general theorem, than we can fromone or two. (6.) In matters which require present practice, both sacred and civil, we must content ourselves oftentimes with a mere pre- ponderation of probable reasons or arguments. Where there are several reasons on each side, for and against a thing that is to be done or omitted, a'small argument added to the heap may justly turn the balance on one side, and determine the judgment, as I have noted in the Second Part of Logic. To conclude ; a growing acquaintance with matters of learning, and a daily improvement of our understandings in affairs human and divine, will best teach us to judge and distin- guish in what cases the number of arguments adds to their weight and force. It is only experience can fully inform us when 'we must be determined by probable topics, and when we must seek. and expect demonstrations. VI. " Prove your conclusion (as far as possible) by some propositions that are in themselves more plain, evident, and cer- tain, than the conclusion ; or at least such as are more known, and more intelligible to the person whom you would convince." If we neglect this rule, we shall endeavour to enlighten that which is obscure by something equally or more obscure, and to confirm that which is doubtful by something equally or more un- certain. Common sense dictates to all men, that it is impossible' to establish any truth, and to convince others of "it, but by some- thing that is better known tb them than that truth is. VII: "'Labour in all your arguings to enlighten the under- standing, as well as to conquer and captivate the judgment." Arguein such a manner as may give a natural, distinct, and solid knowledge of things to your hearers, as well as to force their assent by a mere proof of the question. Now to attain this end, the chief topic or medium of your demonstration should he fetched as much as possible, from the nature of the thing to be proved, or from those things which are most naturally connected with it. Geometricians sometimes break this rule without neces- sity, two ways; namely,
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