CHAPTER XVf11. 141 single argument or answer ; as if one should ask me, Are you a professed disciple of the Stoicsor the Platonists ? Do you give an assent to the principles of Gassendus, Descartes, or Sir Isaac Newton ? Have you chosen the hypothesis of Tycho or Copernicus ? Have you devoted yourself to the sentiments of Arminius or Calvin ? Are your notions episcopal, presbyterian or independent ? &e. I think it may be very proper in such cases not to give an answer in the gross, but rather to enterinto a detail of particulars, andexplain one's own sentiments. Perhaps there is no man, nor set of men upon earth whose sentiments I entirely follow. God has given me reason to judge for myself, and though 1 may see sufficient ground to agree to the greatest part of the opinions of one person or party, yet it does by no means follow that I should receive them all. Truth does not always go by the lump, nor does error tincture and spoil all the articles of belief that some one party professes. Since there are difficulties attending every schemeof human knowledge, it is enough for me in the main to incline to that side which has the fewest difficulties ; and I would endeavour, as far as possible, to correct the mistakes or the harsh expressions of one party, by softening and reconciling methods, by reducing the extremes, and by borrowing some of the best principles or phrases from another. Cicero was one of the greatest men of antiquity, and gives us an account ofthe various opinionsof phi- losophers in his age ; but he himself was of the Eclectic sect, and chose ont of each of them such positions, as in his wisest judg- ment came nearest to the truth. XXI. When you are called in the course of life or religion to judge and determine concerning any question, and to affirm or deny it, take a full survey of the objections against it, as well as of the arguments for it, as far as your time and circumstances admit, and see on which side the preponderation falls. If either the objections against any proposition, or the arguments for the defence of it, carry in them most undoubted evidence, and are plainly unanswerable, they will and ought to constrain the as- sent, though there may be many seeming probabilities on the other side, which at first sight would flatter the judgment to favour it. But where the reasons on both sides are very near of equal weight, there suspension or doubt is our duty, unless in case wherein present determination or practice is required, and there we must act according to the present appearing preponder- ation of reasons. XXII In matters of moment and importance, it is our duty indeed to seek after certain and conclusive arguments, (if they can bedound) in order to determine a question ; but where the matter is of littleconsequence, it is not worth our labour to spend much time in seeking after certainties; it is sufficient here, if
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