CHAPTEf IV. 191 honest, if they had full opportunities and capacities of knowing the truth, and are free from all suspicion of deceit in relating it, ought to sway our assent ; especially when multitudes concur in the same testimony, and when there are many other attending circumstances that raise the proposition which they dictate to the degree of moral certainty. But in this very case, even in mattersof fact and affairs of history, we should not too easily give in to all the dictates of tradition, and the pompous pretences to the testimony of men, till we have fairly examined the several things which are neces- sary to make up a credible testimony, and to lay a just founda- tion for our belief. There are and have been so many falsehoods imposed upon mankind, with specious pretences of eye and ear witnesses, that should make us wisely cautious and justly suspi- cious of reports, where the concurrent signs of truth do not fairly appear, and especially where the matter is of considerable importance. And the less probable the fact testified is in itself, the greater evidence may we justly demand of the veracity of that testimony on which it claims to be admitted. III. The last case wherein authority most govern us is, when we are called to believe what persons under inspiration have dictated to us. This is not properly the authority of men, but of God himself ; and we are obliged to believe what that au- thority asserts, though our reason at present may not be able any other way to discover the certainty or evidence of the propo- sition : it is enough if our faculty of reason, in its best exer- cise, can discover the divine authority which has proposed it. 'Where doctrines of divine revelation are plainly published, to- gether with sufficient proofs of their revelation, all mankind are bound to receive them, though they cannot perfectly under-. stand them ; for we know that God is true, and cannot dictate falsehood. But if these pretended dictates are directly contrary to the natural faculties of understanding and reason which God has given us, we may be well assured these dictates were never re- vealed to us by God himself. When persons are really influenced by authority to believe pretended mysteries, in plain opposition to reason, and yet pretend reason for what they believe, this is but a vain amusement. There is no reason whatsoever that can prove or establish any authority so firmly, as to give it power to dictate in matters of belief, what is contrary to all the dictates of our reasonable nature. God himself bas never given us any such revelations ; and I think it may be said, with reverence, he neither can nor Will do it, unless he changes our faculties from what they are at present. To tell us we must believe a proposition which is plainly contrary to reason, is to tell us that we must believe. two
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