ESSAY It. 355 qualities, any more than there canbe what the schools call materie prima, or first matter abstracted from all forms, or then there can be pure qualities existingabstracted from all substances. Who can tell what is motion or resistance, without including the idea of some substance moved or resisting ? Nor can any one have the idea of substance in bodies, without the idea of solid exten- sion ; nor in minds, without the idea of cogitation, or acogitative power. But to proceed further in this enquiry about substance. Body and Spirit are the two most general and distinct, if not the only, ideas we have of substances. i. e. of such things-or beings which we conceive as the subjects or supporters of distinct quali- ties, and which subsist of themselves without dependence upon any creature. Now let us for the present suppose body to be solid extension, and spirit to be a power of cogitationor thinking, of at least that theseare the prime distinguishing properties of these two beings, and we will enquire whether there be need of any further idea of some substance to support them. These two, viz. body and spirit, seem to be sufficient sup- portsfor all the qualities or modes that we can have any idea of, since they are all either sensible, intellectual, or abstracted, as we shall shew afterward. Body or solidextension is a sufficient subs jest br support for any other corporeal or sensible qualities, whether it be figure, size, colour, motion, rest, resistance, situa- tion, &c. they all plainly subsist in solid extension as in their sub- ject : Think ofyellowness, roundness, hardness, swiftness, touch- ing, resistance, or any other bodily qualities, they all want solid extension in order to subsist, and they want nothing else. So spirit, or a power of thinking, is a sufficient subject or support'for any intellectual qualities, whether it be consciousness, knowing, reasoning, doubting, fearing, hoping, wishing, willing, resolving, chusing, refusing, &c. all these subsist plainly in it cogitative nature or power as in their subject, especially supposing this power to be always in act. As for such abstracted ideas or modes; as cause, effect, likeness, difference, &c. they belong sometimes to bodies, sometimes to spirits, but they need nothing to sup- port them as their subject, besides a thinking power or sold extension. And as solid extension and a power ofthinking bave this one character of substance that they are sufficient supports for quali- ties, modes or accidents ; so they have the other property ofsub- stance also, viz. that they subsist of themselves, independent of any created being : No creaturecan give being to one particle of solidextension, or the meanest thinkingpower, or can annihilate and destroy either of them, and put them out of being : Not the feeblest spirit, or the least particle of matter or body, can be utterly destroyed and annihilated by the most powerful creature: z 2
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