336 OF SUBSTANCE, BODY AND SPIRIT. I might add yet further, that since Mr. Locke declares our idea of particular distinct substances to be " several combinations of simple ideas co-existent in some unknown cause of their union, and which makes the whole subsist by itself," why may not a power of thinking be this supposed unknown cause and subject of the combination of the several properties of spirits ? And why maynot solid extension be the cause of the union of the several properties and qualities of body ? What is there necessary to unite all the properties of matter beyond solid extension ? Make a trial of all the modes that can belong to any material being : What do they want but solid extension to unite them ? Make the same' trial by taking a survey of the properties of a spirit : Will not the idea of a thinking power unite them all? Why then may we not suppose that solid extension and a thinking power may be the very substances themselves, though the names grammatical& taken may seem to denoteproperty and quality ? The following considerations may perhaps lead the mind into a favourable dispositiontoward this opinion, or at least relieve the seeming strangeness of it from the chargeof absurd and im- possible. SECT. III.--Considerations to support the Application of the Naine of Substance to solid Extension and a thinking Power. FIRST, Since our most piercing thoughts cannot reach deep enough to find out, to know or conceive ofany subject or substra- tum that upholds this power oj' cogitation in spirits, or this idea of solid extension in bodies, why should we imagine there is any such unknown and unknowable being ? May we net suspect that learnedand logicalforms of speaking have introduced this serf of notion into our minds, rather than any physical necessity could introduce it into the natureof things ? And why should we sup- pose and multiply real beings without necessity ? Why maynot- these very ideas of solid extension and á thinking power be the substrata or substances themselves, since we have no idea of any other? Second, If we can lay aside all our prejudices in this point, I am persuaded solid extension would appear substantial enough tobe called a substance, since even mere empty space, or extension without solidity, bath been by some philosophers esteemed sub- stantial enough to subsist by itself and to deserve the honour of this name ? And why may not a spirit or mind be a power and yet a substance, a self-subsistent power in perpetual acts? Do we not know that the acute and laborious schoolmen among their deep reasonings tell us, that God is an eternal self- existent act, or almighty power in eternal act ? And this certainly inheres in no subject : God is 4 substance or subject himself : In their way
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