ESSAY II; 357 of speaking they call God the most actual act, and yet that does not binder them from calling biro also the most substantial sub- stance. And what nobler or more grand and illustrious idea can we frame of the bléssed'God; than to- conceive of 111m as an un- limited power of consciousness and volition in the most constant and universal activity ? Note, In this case I may so far agreewith the schooltnen, as not to make very much distinction Between a power of cogitation or thinking, and that actual cogitationor thought which is consi- dered in the general and permanent idea of it, as ever existing andas determined to particular objects simultaneous or successive. And this I may venture to say, because I supposed this power to be in constant and perpetual act, and necessarily so, even in cre- ated spirits, when once they are created ; and herein they are a bright emblem of the blessed God, all consciousness and activity. It is the very nature of God to be conscious and active : if he ceases to be conscious and active, he ceases to be. Conscious activity is also the essence of every spirit. A noble rank of beings we are, the living and lively offspring and image of that intellectual and vital- power who gave us ,being. Te yap ynt *rim, said Aratus and St. Paul. Thirdly, Consider that if solid extension and a thinking power are but mere modes or qualities, and not substances, then !enquire, may not the substances remain ifthese modes were de- stroyed ? But destroy solid extension, and in the room of it there will remain a mere nothing. Destroy thinking power, and there remains nothing in its room. We have no idea left. All ideas are utterly banishedout of the mind, and all beings are banished out of the world at once by this supposition. Therefore it seeing tome that solidextension anda cogitative power are real substan- ces, for if you nullify them theyleave mere nothing behind them. If you suppose space to be something rernaing behind, I have ac- eounted for- that in another Essay. Perhaps you willanswer, that the essential modesor proper- ties of a being cannot be destroyed without destroying the sub- stance also, though the accidental modes or qualities may be de- stroyed while the substance remains; so roundness in a bowl is an essential mode or property, and if you destroy roundness the bowl is destroyed ; it is a bowl- no longer ; and so solid exten- sion and thinking power may be essential modes-or properties of certain- substances to which they belong, and therefore they can- not be destroyed without destroying the substance. To this I reply, that what is only and merely a mode or property (even though it be-an essential mode) of any particular being, whether body or spirit, may be destroyed, and yet some substance, some real being will remain ; though its essential mode being destroyed, it will not have the same form or name as z3
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