360 OF SUBSTANCE, BODY AND SPIRIT. had this tendency, and he even allows the consequence of it, which I call dangerous : For book 1V. chap. 3. § 6. he seems to suppose that matter may think; for he speaks thus, " We have the ideas of matter and thinking' ; but possibly shall never be able to know whether any mere material being thinks or no ; it being impossible for us by the contemplationof our own ideas without revelation to discover whether omnipotency has not given- to some systcPtns of matter fitly disposed a power to prceive and think," or as lie expresses it afterward, to superadd to matter a faculty of thinking ; and he goes on in that section to confirm this his supposition. In his letter to Bishop Stillingfieet, he supposes it possible for the substance of body to be the same with the substance of mind, in these words : <: Thegeneral idea of substance being the same every where, the modificationof thinking, or the power of thinking joined to it, makes it a spirit, without considering what other' modifications it has, as whe- ther it has the modification of solidity or no : As on the other side, substance that has the modification of solidity, is matter, whether it has the modification of thinking or no. Let. 1st, to the Bishop of Worcester, p. 66. Thus we see he maintains his notion of ageneral substance which he had before ridiculed. And we may observe, that whenhe asserts that mat- ter cannot think, he uses some of these epithets, mere, bare, pure, incogitatire, insensible matter, B. 2, c. 23. §. 15. and B. 4. c. 10. §. 10, 11, 16. Now why should an author use such limitative terms, as bare, pure, Ste. incogitative matter, if he did not suppose some matter might be cogitative? But if this be true, that matter can have a power of think- ing given it, then our own souls may be material beings, for ought we know, and consequently divisible and mortal,. And yet further 1 add, if this opinion shouldbe true, then howcan we tell' but God himself, even the infinite mind, may have also the property of solid extension, that is, may also be matter or body.; and then he may be the same with the universe of beings,, as Spinoza fancied; and thus the whole universe, God and this world, may be the same individual substance, which Spinoza maintains with subtlety; for if there be such a thing as an universal ulterior substratum necessary to support solid extension, and to support the power of thinking, and this substance or substratum be so unknown a thing as Mr. Locke supposes, how can I deny any thing concerning it ? Or at least how can I be sure that God and the material world have not one common substance ? In that section indeed Mr. Locke en- deavours to guard his principles or doctrines from the danger of this objection, which lie supposes very, naturally to arise from his principles and concessions ; but I think he neither does, nor perhaps could he effectually secare them from such unhappy con- aequeuces.
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