ESSAY II. sol Seer. IV.The Occasions of Mistake on this Subject. IN the last place, let us consider how it comes to pass that the learned world might happen to mistake in this matter, and why they seem so unwilling to admit this doctrine of solid extension and of a power of thinking to be two real substances, or sufficient substrata or subjects for all the qualitiesof matter and mind. The first occasion of mistake may be this. In our daily observation of what passes in the material world, we find many of the qualities or properties of bodies continually altered, and new qualities or properties perpetually succeeding the old ones which are lost or destroyed, but the sub- stance remains still the same : And therefore we suppose, and veryjustly, that there must be some certain thing called sub- stance, which supports all these changing properties and quali- ties in their successive existence. So a piece of wood put into the fire,. loses most of the properties or qualities of wood, and becomes fire itself; or a burning coal ; its colour and hardness or firmness are lost, it has acquired a new colour, (viz.) Redness and newpower, (viz.) of heating water, of melting metal; and burning combustible things, &c. In an hour's time this same' matter turns into ashes, and thenits colour is changed again into a dusky white or grey, the cohesion of its parts or consistency is quite lost, and it becomes quite another sort of body, a million of small atoms, aheap of corpuscles or sands ; yet we suppose the subsiance'whieh once had the qualities ofwood, still continues, as indeed it does; and.' that is, I say, solid extension or natter, though it is broke into many little substances or solid extensions. And in the same manner, because we sometimes call solidity and extension two properties or qualities of body, we are too ready to imagine they may be rankest' among those many qualities which may lie changed, or'removed and lost, while yet the sub- stance remains; whereas this is impossible. And yet perhaps this imagination may be one of the springs of our mistake. So in a spirit or soul, we find' infinite varieties of thoughts, wishes, desires,,perpetually altering and succeeding one another, and sometimes contrary to one another; andyet we suppose, (and justly, too) that the substance of the spirit remains the same. gut since we sometimes call a power of thinking a pro. perty of a spirit, we are too easily led to rank this also among those Many qualities and properties, which may be altered while the substance of the soul remains ; which perhaps is impossible; and yet this may be the first occasion of our mistake here. Secóndly, Another spring or ground of mistake may he this Most of these things which are thus altered, while the substance remains, as in a logical view they two called qualities, so in a
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