ESSAY iII, 377 them ; and though I think no more of a bowl or a spirit, of roundness or heaviness, of joy or grief, yet I retain the abstract- ed ideas of substance and mode, and apply them to a thousand things besides. As the ideas of cause and substance and mode may be pro- perly called pure abstracted ideas, so the causality or the substan- tiality of a thing, or its modality, are yet more abstracted ideas, or have another degree of abstraction ; for these words signify only theview or consideration of a thingas a cause, as a substance, or as a mode. Suchalso are the ideas ofgenus and species, of nomo, verb, &c. and a multitude of such very abstracted ideas belong to common speech as well as to learned writings. Here let it be noted, that the ideas of cause, effect, substance, mode, likeness, du(ference,and many other abstracted ideas ofthis sort, are precisely the same ideas, whether they are drawn ori- ginally from corporeal or from intellectual beings, and therefore they are plainly different from the first sort of abstract ideas which are either intellectual or corporeal ; nor can these be ranked un- der either of those two classes, for they are ideas of another distinct kind, and make a class of their own, i. e. pure abstract ideas. If therefore we confine ourselves strictly and entirely to those two things which Mr. Locke asserts to be the springs and causes of all our ideas, viz. sensation and reflection, with- out admitting this third principle, viz. the soul's power of com- paring ideas and abstracting onte from another, we shall hardly account for the numerous abstracted ideas whichwe have, where. of many are neither intellectual nor corporeal, though they are all evidently at first derived from corporeal or from spiritual ob- jects and ideas ; and the original remote springs of them may be sensation or reflection, though these are not the immediate causes of them. Seemore in the Treatise of Logic, part I chap. III. sect. I.
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