984 AN ENQUIRY ADQtIT INNATE IDEA'S. nature there are some few instantesof'it in most persons, Which appear chiefly in the workings of benevolence, and compassion in us towards sensible creatures, with some inward aversions to cruelty, and perhaps also, some sort of natural reverence toward the almighty . power, whom we call God, when we come to know him. These things are some ruinous remains of that goodness, virtue, or piety which was natural to innocent man, and are partly wrought, perhaps into his animal nature, as well as in his souk : These instincts are certain relics of a spur to duty, and a bridle to restrain from vice, and many times become an auxiliary or ready help to the practice of virtue But it is still reason exercising itself, and judging of the fitness and unfitness of things, by and according to these native and essential principles of reasoning which I have spoken of, that is the only rule or test of what is vice, and what is virtue, so far as the light of nature can certainly discover it; for if it should be left to mere instinct to be a general test or rule to judge of vice and virtue, without the superintendency of reason, or the final determination of the fitness and unfitness of things thereby, the concerns of mora- lity and religion would be left at a very great uncertainty. This has been well argued and determined by an excellent" writer on the foundations of moral goodness, in a small pam- phlet 1728. Now I don't think any of Mr. Locke's arguments against innate ideas or propositions, have force enough in them to dis- prove the account I have here given of, the mind's judging of natural and moral truths, by such sort of native principles. Nor do I imagine Mr. Locke himself would oppose this account. For he owns that there are such things as innate principles, see chap.. 3, Ö 3. He calls the desire of happiness, and the aversion to misery, that is in all men, innate practical principles, and seems to prove them such, because they continue constantly to operate and influence all our actions ; and adds, " That if we had any innate truths in the mind, we should always feel them influencing our knowledge. And I beg leave to add by way of reply, And so Ive do always feel theseprinciples which I have spoken of influencing our ,judgment whensoever we judge ; therefore, according to his own argument, they are in some sort innate or wrought in us by nature, though, (as I have often said) not in the form of propo- sitions. These are the springs of our judgment on natural and moral subjects :. And if any should ask why I judge so or so, even in self evident speculative principles, or why I decide a case thus or thus in moral enquiries, which are equally evident; I answer, because it is the make of my mind, it is its very consti- tution, and it cannot judge otherwise And in particular propo- sitio.;s, is heftier speculative or practical, the mind is influenced to AN
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