ESSAY VE. 408 walls, and must have one part of it penetrating one wall (sup- pose an inch or two) and the other the other; and thus it is ex- tended also; or else it must be acknowledged to be excluded from all place, which is the thing that was to be proved. But if a soul be extended, it has dimensions, it is certainly shaped or figured ; for since it is not infinite, this extension has limits on all sides ; and, as has been elsewhere mentioned, the limit of all extension whatsoever is figure or shape. But if a spirit lias any shape or figure, I would ask whether it could not lose part of this shape ? I am sure our ideas will allow it. Our clearest ideas must allow possible division to every extended figured being : Whether it willcontinue after division to be a soul and to think or no, is another question ; but what is actually a long and broad and deep substance, and does not fill all place, lothcertainly allow onepart of this substance tofill one place, and another another ; and why may not the two parts of this substance be divided, and thus fill two distant placesas wellas two adjacent places ? It is in vain to talk of its being one conti- nuum and being indiscerptible, since it is plain we may conceive of any extended infinite substance as divided, and as existing in two places when divided. Surely division does not nullify either part of what was before an extended and substantialbeing. This may be said indeed, but it is said not only without ideas, but con- trary to them. Again, If my spirit has any shape, it is surely commensu- rate and correspondent to my whole body, or to some part of it. Then I would enquire, whether the soul may not he maimed by the sudden stroke of a sword or bullet which carries off that part of the body ? or whether it contracts or shrinks up itself to avoid the wound, and thus grows denser in that part than it was before ? But such a supposition would imply a degree of solidity, and reduce it into body. In short, if its extension be any thing dif- ferent from empty space, and if it has a shape, then according to our clearest ideas it must be divisible in its own nature, even though it should be never so nimble and watchful to avoid any corporeal weapons, or though it should be subtle enough to penetrate them ; for if it be a finite figured being, it must be divisible. Again, I would query, whether or no the one whole power of cogitation be extended through the whole shape and bulk of the soul, or whether a distinct lesser power belongs to every part of it ? Ifcogitation belong to every part of it there are so many cogitative beings, or so many thinking powers in it, as thereare parts of extension if the whole is one cogitative power, then. I would enquire, is the power of thinking as long, and broad, and deep, as the whole soul is ? Does the whole dimensionof the lout operate in every thought, or a part only ? Is the whole cc2
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