ESSAY VI. 407 be repeated in the same manner with regard to a spirit's consci= ousness or sensation of the motions of oneor more bodies. I have intimated this already, but I will speak of it now a little more particularly. As I cannot conceive howproximity between spirit and body should enable it to excite any motion in that body, so neither can proximity give that mind any consciousness of that body's motions, and therefore I must impute this also to divine appointment, and to that only. For let us consider a little. Suppose the soul to reside in the brain, or let it be diffused through the whole betty, (it is the same thing in my argument) it is still supposed to penetrate the part where it resides, or to be co-extended with it; but this co- extension with the body, or with any part of it, does by no means give it a consciousness of the parts which it penetrates ; for if it did, then every human spirit would know precisely where it dwells, whether it resided in the whole-body, or in any particu- lar part of it. If it were diffused through the whole body, every human soul would be an exquisite anatomist, and be conscious of all its bowels, muscles, nerves, veins, arteries, &c, and know what fibres were discomposed when any animal disorder or pain arose in the body ; but this is contrary to all experience. Again, If the soul resided locally in any particular part of the body, orof the brain, and received its consciousnesses from its co-extension with that part, the contests about the common sensory, whether it be thepineal gland, or the extreme origin of each nerve, or the whole brain, would quickly be decided by every human spirit, for it would be conscious of the place of its own residence. But this also is contrary to all experience ; for the best philosophers are ignorant to this day, what is that pre- cisepart of the brain whence the soul immediately derives its notice of sensible things, i. e. where is the common sensory. Yet further, it is evident, that this spirit which is supposed to reside in the brain, because we feel ourselves think as it were in the brain, is much more conscious of other motions in distant parts of the body, than it is of the particles in the brain, which it is supposed to penetrate ; it is conscious not only of shapes, motions and magnitudes of outward bodies, by their impressions on the organs of sense, but it is also conscious of sensible quali- ties, colours, sounds, cold, heat, &c. though they come from far distant bodies : It is conscious of ease, appetite, pain, &c. in parts distant from the brain ; it is in short conscious of every thing that Godhas thought fit to make it conscious of for the preservation anduse of animal nature, and for all the purposes of this present life; and yet it is not consciousof the shape, or motion, or situation of the small fibres, or pulpous or nervous parts of the brain, where it is supposed to reside, and which it is supposed to penetrate; all which is a plain proof that it is not
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