Watts - BX5200 .W3 1813 v.8

464 ON SOME METAPHYSICAL SUBJECTS. use the word nature for those settled rules by which the power- ful will of God governs his creatures ; and it is only in this sense nature stands in opposition to miracle, for it is in this sense only that God can change the natural course of things by miraculous influence. The term nature stands also for the principles of reason within us. By nature we learn that there is a God, and that man is not his own maker. The same word nature also signifies the eternalfitness or unfitness of things, and their moral relations as well as natural and in general it means the spring and foun- dation of all those'duties which reason teaches us; so we say, it is a law of' nature that God must be honoured, contracts ought to be kept, gratitude is due to benefactors, and compassion must be shewn to the distrest. It is in this sense that nature is usually distinguished from revelation, as when we say; man by nature may be taught to worship God, but it is only revelation teaches him that God will be worshipped by a mediator. SECT. IV.-Of Creation or Conservation. IT has been a very famous question in the schools, whether conservation be a continual creation, i. e. whether that action whereby God preserves all creatures in their several ranks and orders of being, is not one continued act of his creatingpower or influence, as it were, giving being to them every moment ; whe- ther creatures being formed out of nothing would relapse again into their first state of nonentity, if they were not, as it were, particularly re-produced by a creating act of God: Now there is one plain and easy argument whereby perhaps this contro- versy may be determined, and it may be proposed in this manner. In whatsoever moment God creates a substance he must create with it all the properties, modes and accidents which be- long to it in that moment ; for in the very moment of creation, the creature is all passive, and cannot give itself those modes. Now if God every moment create wicked men and devils, and cause them to exist such as theyare by a continued act of crea- tion, must he not at the same time create, or give being, to all their sinful thoughts and inclinations, and even their most cri- minal and abominable actions ? Must he not create devils toge- ther with the rage and pride, the malice, envy and blasphemy of their thoughts? Must he not create sinful men in the very acts of lying, perjury, stealing and adultery, rapine, cruelty, and murder? Must lie not form one man with malice in his heart ? Another with a false oath on the tongue ? A third with a sword in his hand, plunging it into his neighbour's bosom ? Would not these formidable consequences follow from the sup

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