ESSAY'XII. 471. and has great conveniency in it, yet I cannot but assent to Mr. Locke's complaint, that it has perhaps been one occasion of lead-, ing mankind into some mistaken conceptions' about the several actions of the mind of man. But amongst the rest, he supposes this also to be a mistake That we ascribe liberty to the will; for since (argues he) the will is a power of the man to determine his own actions, and liberty is also a power of the man to act or not to act, &c. both these are properly powers of the man, and onepower cannot be ascribed to another, nor liberty ascribed to the will. And he supposes us guilty of the same mistake, when we say, the understanding directs the will, or the will obeys the un- derstanding, for they are two powers of the man, which have not an agency oroperation upon each ; othersince operation, saith he, belongsonly to. agents, or real beings, and not to powers. All these agencies of powers on each other therefore he roundly denies, § 17, 18, 19. and says, that the power of thinking, operates not on the power of chusing, nor the power of chusing on the power of thinking. But I beg leave to observe, that this operation of onepower on another, is the common way of thinking and speaking amongst men, with regard to the powers of the body as well as those of the mind, nor do I know any impropriety in it, nor any reason why it should be altered. When the anther speaks of the faculties of the body, he names the digestive and expulsive faculty ; and is it not proper to say, that in an animal, the diges- tive power operates upon the expulsive, and assists it in its operation ? May we not 'say also, that the masticative or chew- ing faculty operates upon the digestive, and accelerates it in digestion, without supposing these faculties to be real and dis- tinct beings, different from the body ? So, in his other instance of singing and dancing ; Why may we not say, that Apollo's power of singing or music operates on Lesbia's power of dancing, since she dances according to his notes of music ? And is it not proper to say, That the power of thinking, wherebyI perceive a thing to be good, operates upon the power of abusing it ? Or the power of chusing or willing, operates on the power of think- ing, when I set myself to think on any particular subject by my volition or choice for an hour together ? Now Mr. Locke's design in all this denial of such attributions to a power, is, as I hinted before, to support his assertion, That liberty or freedom belongs not to the will; and therefore he supposes it is as unreasonable and unintelligible a question to ask, Whether a man's will be free or not, as it is to ask, Whether his sleep be swift; or his virtue square ; for liberty, which in his sense is but a power to actor not to act, belongs only toagents,
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