478 REMARKS ON MR. LOCKE'S ESSAY. which always thinks in the same person, which in this case mat- ters not at all. Different substances by the same consciousness (where they do partake in it) being united into one person, as well as different bodiesby the same life are united into one animal, whose identity is preserved in the change of substances by the unityof one continued life ; for it being the same consciousness that makes a man be himself to himself, personal identity depends on that only, whether it be annexed only to one individual sub- stance, or can be continued in a succession of several substances, The same consciousness uniting those different actions into the same person, whatever substances contributed to.their pro- duction." Any man that reads this, and knows that the author is in doubt whether matter may not think, would be ready to suspect that he is so very solicitous to make the same substance unneces- sary to personal identity, that sohe may maintain his supposed pos- sibility of matter being made capableof thinking ; and that it may be possible that thinking may inhere in animal nature, whose constituent particles of flesh and blood may be perpetually chang- ed, and yet the animal remain the same, and be the same per- son too. But to indulgeno further suspicions, let us consider what he affirms plainly, viz. that personal identity consists only in consci- ousness ; for, says he, section 10th, " As far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea of anypast action, with the same consci- ousness it had of it at first, orthat it has of any present action, so far it isthesaine personal self ; for it is by the consciousness it has of its present thoughts and actions that it is self to itself norm; and so it will be the same sef as far as the same consciousness can extend to actions past or to come : and he puts these questions, section 12th, whether if the same substance which thinks be changed, it can be the same person ? or whether if it remain the same, it can be different persons i" To this he answers, This must be allowed to those who place thought in a purely material animal constitution, void of any immaterial substance, because the substances are perpetually changing in animal nature : but supposing immaterial substances only to think, yet he seems to think it hard to shew why personal identity cannot be preserved in the change or variety of imma- terial substances, as well as animal identity is preserved in the change of material substances. Thus it is evident, that by his reasonings, he makes the sameness of a person to consist entirely, and only in consciousness, which he had before plainly and strong- ly asserted. I acknowledge he lias offered some plausible arguments for it, and he has also mentioned some formidable objections against his own opinion ; but I question whether he has so well refuted
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