ESSAY XII. 479 those objections, as to render that opinion of his certain and evident, viz. that the sameness of persons consists not in the sameness of substances, either material or thinking, i. e. either body or mind, but merely in a consciousness of the saine thoughts or actions. There is no need of debating the point about a man's being the same person with himself at the present time, because a man's own present consciousness will secure to him his own personal identity, though perhaps it will not confine it to himself alone. But the chief difficulty relates to his being the same with himself at distant times. And here let tit consider some of thedifficulties he proposes against his own sentiments. L. He seems to allow, that according to his description of -personal identity, two different men may be one and the same person ; for in his 13th and 14th sections, as well as in other parts of this chapter, he grants that a different spirit created long after may possibly have the consciousness of actions done by a spirit existent many ages before, imprest upon it. ; by this means the mayor of Queenborough might suppose his soul lead been the soul of Socrates, as section 19th, and this latter soul or spirit, or this man, becomes the same person with the former, and thus Socrates and the mayor of Queenborough become one person. But I deny this to be proper conscious remembrance : It is only a delusive impression on the mindor fancy imitating the act of memory ; it is a strong belief of what is false. And can such a frenzy be sufficient to turn two men into one person ? Must Domitian be really the same person with Romulus, if his pride could so far impress his imagination, and impose upon his memory, as to persuade him that he built Rome ? Is not this contrary to all the senseand reason, as well as the language of mankind ? And might not Domitian by the same madness be- come Ninus, and Darius, and Plato, and twenty persons as well as two ? 2. He seems to suppose, that real forgetfulness may make a distinct person as well as fancied memory may make the same ; and thus Domitien was not the same person that killed fleas, if standing at the head of his army his pride should so far over- power his memory, as to blot out all the traces ofthat contempti- ble employment of his former hours. And suppose that one of his soldiers should by a disorder of his brain imagine, that lie was conscious that he himself had thus been employed in the palace of Domitian, and that he was then the emperor ; and would this forgetfulness of the one, and frenzy of the other, make two Domitians upon the spot, or two persons of Domitian ? Doth not this author allow in section 19, that if Socrates asleep puts forth any actions, and is not consciousof it when he awakes, sleeping and waking Socrates is not the same person ?
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