ESSAY XII. 481 his equity?apd truth will, discover themselves in attributing proper recompeuces to rnen or spirits, considered only as persons, or in their personal identity, t. e. as conscious of their own former ac- tions of vice or virtue. But without running,to aforensic sense, there are so many inconveniences that may arise from such a notion of personal sameness, even in the common affairs of human, life, as well as in philosophical science, as may utterly discourage our assent to this notion. The word person is often used, if not most frequently, with- out any forensic sense : We say, " There were five persons pre- sent in the room at such a time, or I had but one person with nie, &c." And how can we tell how many persons were or were not present, if the supposed consciousness of five other persons should place them there at that time, and render them the same persons ? Or if the supposed forgetfulness of the persons really present should take away their personal identity ? 1 fear this opinion, if universally received, would bring in endless confu- sions, wheresover theword person was introduced. Well, if Mr. Locke's opinion will not stand, the remaining question will be then, " What is personal identity, or wherein does it really consist ?" . . First, I wouldhere observe and allow, that weare now con- sidering the word person rather in a philosophical than a mere vul- gar sense : for I grant there are some modes of vulgar expres- sion, wherein the idea of personality seems confined to the body of man : and thus we say, " A very tall person, or.a very comely person :" Or when a consumption has madea man lean and pale, or the small pox has altered the countenance, we are ready to say, that "our friend is not the same person that he was before." It is plain, that these phrases relate purely to the qualities of the body.. And sometimes the same mode of speaking is used, with regard merely to the qualities of the mind in union with the body, as when by long sickness or old age the memory or reasoning powers are impaired, we say of our. neighbour, " He is quite another person than once he was." But our business here is to consider personality rather in its philosophical signification, which yet is by no means so very different from the more usual meaning of it in common life, as Mr. Locke's account of it is. I 'answer therefore secondly, that with regard to mankind, which is the only thing we are now concerned about, the same person in an incomplete sense, is the same intelligent substance, or the same conscious mind or spirit ; but in a complete sense, it is the same spirit united to the same body, that is, in short, the same man ; person and man are here the same. Nor is this per- sonal sameness altered or abolished, though the man should sometimes be so imposed upon by frenzy, as to suppose himself Vol,. VLI. II is ;>Ui'iïü
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