482 REMARKS ON MR. LOCKERS ESSAY. tohave a conscious memory of actions which were nothis own ; or though he should be utterly forgetful of his own proper actions. Here are four questions then arising. I. Quest. How can the same body be secured to make apart of this sameperson since theparts of an animal are in continual flux and change? I answer, It is most highly probable, that there are someoriginal particles of an animal body, which con- tinue from its birth to its death, through all the gradual and suc- cessive changes of other particles, which may be sufficient to pro- nounce it the same body ; and these may probably continue the same even till the great resurrection. See Essay 8. on that sub- ject. An universal change ofall the particlesof the body at once will hardly allow us to call it the same body. But if there should be no such unchanging particles in the body of man, yet in the same current course of animal life the body may be called the same, according to the common laws of nature, continuing the same animal life under slow and successive changes of the particles of matter, while man abides in this world : And whether any particle be thesame or no in distant years, perhaps itis not of so much importance in any thing that relates to proper personality in this life, since these particles have nothing to do in thinking or consciousness. II. Quest. How is the sameness of the conscious mind or spirit secured to make the other and most considerable part ofthe same person ? How can we be sure that it is the very same spirit or thinking substance ? I answer, That supposing a mind or spirit, or any conscious being to be' entirely immaterial, and (as 1 think) inextended also, it is impossible that any part of the substance of it can be changed or diminished, without destroying the whole ; because it is so uniform and simple a being, it is a con- scious and acting power subsistingby itself. It has no parts, and cannot but exist or cease to exist in the whole or at once. Any new substance therefore coining in the room of this makes it pro- perly a different person, it is another self, another intelligent mind or conscious being : And to do Mr. Locke justice, he ac- knowledges in section 25th, that the more probable opinion is that this consciousness (in which he supposes personal identity to consist) is annexed to one individual immaterial substance. III. Quest. But supposing thatfrenzy should so far impose upon one man as to make him fancy himselt conscious of the former actions of another man, or thatforgetfulnessshould make him unconscious of his own past actions ; how could he know and be assured that he was the same person whoperformed his own actions, or that he was not the same person whoperformed the actions of another ? To this 1 answer, that for the common affairs of human life, God has in general ordained that persons rhould be sufficiently conscious of their own personality andsame-
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