CHAPTER V. 405 us to conceive of any duration without succession : but this per- manent duration of God is his eternitywhich carries some things in it above our present ideas. See more iu the chapters of time and infinities. As creation gives existence to all created substances, so conservation is said togive duration, i. e. continuance in existence to all creatures. Though the most proper idea of creation is the causing a substance to exist which had no existence, yet the word is also used in a less proper sense, when any particular bodies are formed out of such a mass of matter as seems utterly unfit for that end ; when such changes are made in any substance as are generally supposed to be above the power of creatures and be- long to God alone: so God created fish and fowls out of the water, and man and beasts outof the earth ; though the creation of the substance of water or earth, or the matter out of which they were made, is the original sense of the word. Conservation here refers to the same things which are the objects of creation, and on which God is supposed to exercise his almighty power. Queries. Enquire then, how far do creation and conser- vation differ ? Is conservation a continued creation ? See Essay XI. sect. ult. If a creature be once formed would it not continue to exist without any divine conserving act ? Is it possible the Creator should exist without willing or nilling the continued existence of his creatures? Note, Substances being once made, a creature cannot of himselfdestroy them, or make their duration to cease, any more than he couldof himself create them : but multitudes of modes are made and destroyed perpetually at the will of creatures, and are placed within their power. Note, Though time, place, ubiety, might be introduced here and connected with duration, yet they are all plainly re- lative affections, and therefore I refer them to their more pro- per place. CHAP. V. Of Unity and Union. THE next absolute affection to be considered is unity, which perhaps had never had the honour to make a chapter in lletap ysicks, if it had not been coupled with verity and bonity ; which three properties being ascribed by Plato to God the great and eternal being. Aristotle his scholar ascribes them all tó the idea of being in general, and thence came these ideas to make such a figure in ontology : though it must be confessed that several things have been said an these subjectswhich furnish the mind with useful distinctions.
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