Watts - BX5200 .W3 1813 v.8

CHAPTER VI. 497 multitude of things so different and distinct; but may by their likeness or agreement, situation or other circumstances, come to be considered as one thing, and come under one name. Air, water, earth, and all the infinite variety of creatures make one universe; all individuals are united in onespecies, and all species under one genus ; all substances, whether minds or bodies, come under one general name of being; and all the ideas and collec- tion of thoughts as well as words in this book make one treatise of ontology. Note, in all these instances there is a real founda- tion for this mental union. In many unions we have occasion to consider not only the terms which are the things united, but also the means or bond of union between these terms. In a nosegay the bond of union is a thread ; in metals it is solder; in a heap of stones it is juxta- position and gravitation ; between friends the bond of union is love ; between kindred it is birth ; between master and servant it is contract, &c. But there are many things united where the bond of union is unknown, or must be resolved into the appoint- ment of God. What is it unites the parts of matter in a hard body ? What is it'unites the flesh and spirit in man ? Union and composition may give occasion also to speak of abstraction, division, dissolution, separation, tic. which stand in opposition to union. CHAP. VI. OfAct and Power, Action and Passion, Neces- sity and Liberty. THE next absolute affections of being, are act andpower; though it may be a little doubtful whether there is not enough of relation between these two ideas to throw them into the rank of relative affections. Each of these viz. act and power may be dis- tinguished three ways : 1. As actual being or existence is distinguished from poten- tial, or a power to be; So a book already written differs from a book which may be written, or that is merely possible. 2. As actual doing or action is distinguished from a power to do; So the actual putting bodies in motion differs from mo. tivity or a power to move them : So the acts of thinking in spi- rits have some sort of difference from the thinkingpower. 3. As actual suffering or passion is distinguished from a power to suffer: So actual division in matter differs from mere divisibility ; or the actual motionof a body is different from mo- bility or a power to be moved. Here we treat of actionwhich is the exercise of a power to do, and passion which is the exercise of a power to suffer. Note, passion and suffering in this philosophical sense signifies only receiving the act of the agent or doer by the patient or suf- ferer. When hailstones smite upon a rock, the hailstones are the agents, the rock is the patient; it is no matter whether any Vol,. v1II. I 1

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