CHAP 'ER XVI. 525 CRAY. XVI.The chief Kinds or Divisions of Being, and first of Substance and Mode. AFTER we have gone through the various affections of being, we come now to consider what several kinds of being there are : And it is certain they may be distinguished by the . mind of man in very various ways, and cast into several kinds or species: But those which are most common in this science, and indeed not universal, are these three divisions of them. 'Beings are either substances or modes, finite, or itrinite, and natural, artificial or moral. The first and most general divisionofbeing is into substance and node. Every being is considered either as subsisting of itself, with- out the support of any creature, and then it is called substance, as an egg, a tree, air, water, a man, an angel; or it is con- sidered as subsisting by virtue of some other being in which it is, or to which it belongs ; and thou it is called a mode, as length, motion, shape, colour, softness, wisdom, knowledge. Note, When we speak of beings, we do more usually un- derstand substances, because they seem to have a more con- siderable sort of nature and existence ; but since many modes, properties And qualities have also a real existence in nature, and sometimes have other modes and affections belonging to them, besides vast powers and influences in the universe, I think they cannot well be excluded from the comprehensive idea of being. Those philosophers who areof this opinion, are called the realists ; whereas the writers who allow only substances to llave a real existence and deny qualities, properties, relations, or any sort of modes really to exist, because they do out subsist by themselves, these are called nominalists or nominals. It is granted indeed that mere relative modes or relations of things one to another, such as likeness, order, place, &e. seem still to partake less of the nature of beings than such real modes, as motion, figure and quantity do; yet many of these relations have a real fonndatiou in nature, and a sort of reality 1 in things as well as in our conceptions. Query, Must we take them out of all the ranks of being, when the word is taken -in its very largest sense ? Though there have been fierce contentions on this subject between the nonainals and realists, yet the controversy is not worthy of any warm debate : For while it may be allowed on both sides, that being does not in so full and strong a sense be- long to modes, as it does to substances, the disputants may agree by saying, that self-subsisting beings have a substantial essence and existence, whereas the essence er existence of modes- is but I
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