Watts - BX5200 .W3 1813 v.8

CHAPTERX[II. 87 1: That lie must directly contradict the proposition of the respondent, and not merely attack any of the arguments whereby the respondent has supported that proposition : for it is one thing to confute a single argument of the respondent, and another to confute the thesis itself. '2. (Which is a-kin to the former) be must contradict or oppose the very sense and intention of the proposition as the respondent has stated it, and not merely 'oppose the words of the thesis in any other sense ; for this would be the way to plunge the dispute into ambiguity and darkness to talk beside the question, to wrangle about words, and to attack a proposition different from what the respondent has espoused which is called Ignoratio elenchi. 3. He must propose his ar- gument in a plain, short, and syllogistic form, according to the rules of logic, without flying to fallacies or sophisms; and as far as may be, he should use categorical syllogisms. 4. Though the respondent may be attacked either upon a point of his own concession, which is called Argurnentunn ex concessis, or by re- ducing him to an absurdity, which is called Reductio ad absur- dum, yet it is the neatest, the most useful, and the best sort of disputation where the opponent draws his objections from the na- ture of the question itself. .5. Where the respondent denies any proposition, the opponent if he proceed, must directly vindicate and confirm that proposition, that is, he must make that pro- position the conclusion of his next syllogism. 6. Where the respondent limits or distinguishes any proposition, the opponent must directly prove his own proposition in that sense, and ac- cording to that memberof the distinction in which the respondent denied it. XIII. The laws that oblige the respondent are these : 1. To repeat the argument of the opponent in the very same words in which it was proposed, before he attempts to answer it. 2. If the syllogism be false in the logical formof it, he must discover the fault according to the rules of logic. 3. If the ar- gument does not directly and effectually oppose his thesis, he must shew this mistake, and make it appear that his thesis is safe, even though the argument of the opponent be admitted : or at least, that the argument does only aim at it collaterally, or at a distance, and not directly overthrow it, or conclude against it. 4. Where the matter of the opponent's objection is faulty in any part of it, the respondent must grant what is true in it, he must deny what is false, he must distinguish or limit the proposition which is ambiguous or doubtful ; and thengrant- ing the sense in which it is true, he must deny the sense in which it is false. 5. If an hypothetic proposition be false, the respon- dent must deny the consequence : ifa disjunctive, he must deny the disjunction : if a categoric or relative,...he must simply deny it. 6. It is sometimes allowed for the respondent to use an

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