54 / 808
Ephefian.r,C;hap. I.
VE
R. 4.,
make
that treafon,trefpaffe,which
is
committed
againfl
him;
Who
will
challenge this
fad
ofinjuflice
t
Argument.5.
That
which maketh
God
willfame
of
hù
creatures conditionally,
that
is
not
to
begraunted.
But
to
make God
choofe
after the
fa/l,maketh
him
to
have
willed
ineffec-
tually fame
other end.
Gods
will were
not
omnipotent,fhould it not effe/t whatever
it
will
erh
;
Gods
velle,
is
pole
;
neither
can he have
a
conditional! will.
I
will
give my creature life,
if
hee keepe this
commandement
:
For, eyther
hee
mull:
fuppofe
that
his
creature muff doe fomething which he will not
make
him,and then he were
not omnipotent;
or
think
that
he will
make
him
doe that
thing,
and on
doing it give him life, andthis
in
effeta
will
moll:
abfolute;
or
he mull know
that
he neither
will, nor
can
doe
it,
and
yet
will this on
a
condition which he
doth
fee impoffible
; and
this
were
frivolous.
vlrgument.
6.
That
which maketh
God
looke
out
of'
him
felfe,for
determining
hiswill:
But to elei7
and
reject
after the
fall
fugf
cndeth
that
determination
of
bù
will
en
qualification
fore
-feene
in
the
creature,Ergo.
The
firff
part
is
manifefk
;
For
it maketh him
not
having all
fuffici.
ency
in
himfelf,
and
as
it were
imperfeâion
in
his
underftanding,to goe
forth
of
himfelfe,
feeking
knowledge
from things
without him,
as we
doe
;
fo
is
it
for
his will
to looke at things without himfelfe,
that
there-
upon he may determine
his
will.
vlrgument.
7.
That Eletlion and
reprobation which are fhadowed
in
the
perms
of
Jacob and Efau,that
is
the
true elellion and
reprobation.
But eleïlion
and
reprobation ofperfans,
yet
not
aF,tuall
exifting,
but
in
fame
kinde
po/ible,
ofperfonswithout
merit ,
or
demerit,
are fhadawed
orth,Ergo.
Argument.
8.
That
ele£lion
and
reprobation, which make
God a
Potter
framing
his
clay
from
his meere plea
fure,to contrary
ends,af
honour
and
fhame,
that
elehion and reprobation
are
of
man
beforehis
fall.
a.Thefe
later reafons doe more fway with me, and feeme to me
far
more unanfwerable. For
I
cannot
fee,
how God
canbe
thought
to
have
had
other
ends
without many abfurdities,
as
for
example;
r.
Without
holding
he
may fuller defeafance
in
the intentions
he
purpofeth,
and
by
his
providence endeavoureth.
a.That
God
is
mutable,going from
one intention to
another;and that
his will
is
not
effeétually in
everything
it
willeth; that
his will
doth
on
fore
-
fight
of
fome
thing, in the
creature determine it felf to
that, to
which
of
it felfe it is
not determined.
Secondly;I hold
that
the
fureff
way
tracing truly
the order
of
things
in
Gods intention,
is
to
marke well
the
exifling
of
them
in
execution.
Now
we
fee
firft
the
world, was made.
Secondly,man,and
fo
Gods
chò-
fen