T H E 3Lthtng ucnip1, PART II. CONTAINING ANIMADVERSIONS ON SP1NOSA, AND A French Writer pretending to CONFUTE him. With a RECAPITULATION of the FORMER_ PART. And an Account of the Drifittttfatt and 3a,r.à ttttntfonof 0ii '0Cemple amongMen. By j OHN HOWE, M. A. Miniftet of G OD's Word, and fometime Fellow of Magd. Coll. Oxon. LONDOX11: Printed for Thomas Parkhur/l, at the Bible and Three Cretins in Cheapfide ; and Jonathan Robénfon, at the Golden Lion in St. Paul', Church- ` Yard. MDCC It ..:ARliewasarnaprowe
A PREFACES SHEWING, The Inducement, andgeneral COED- tents of this Second Part. The Occa f on of con f dering Spinofa, and a French Writer who pre- tends to confute him. A Spe.. cimenofthe Way, andStrength of the former's Reafoning, as an Introduction to a more di- pinci Examination of filch of his Pofitions, as the Deign of this Difcourf e was more direelly concerned in; T is not worth the while to trou- ble the Reader with an Account why the progrefs of this Work begun many Years ago, in a former Part) bath been fo long delayd ; or 2 2 why
11 A Preface. why it is now refit/7;d. There are Cafes wherein things Loo little for publick Notice, may be iutficient R.eafons to one felf : And fuch felf-fatisfaction is all that can be requifite, in a Matter of no more importance than that Circu-m- fiance only, of the time of fending abroad a .Difourf, of fuch a Nature and Subjea, as that if it can be life- ful at any time, will be fo at all times. The Bufìnefs of the prefent Di eourfe, is RELIGION ; which is not the Concern ofan Age only, or of this or that Time, but of all Times ; and which, in refpeCt of its Grounds and Bats, is Eternal, and can never ceafe, - or vary. But if in its...3fe and Exercif it do at any time more vilibly languifh, by Atternpr Againfi its Foundations,an En- deavour to effablit'h them, if it be not altogether unfit to ferve that Purpofe, will not be liable to be biamed as unfea- fonable. Every One will underfland, that a Deign further to eflabdifh the Grounds cif Religion, can have no other mean- ing, than only to reprefent their Stabi= lty pnfhaken by apy Attempts upon them 7
A Preface. them ; that being all that is either pof- fíble in this Cafe, or needful. Nothing more is pofjible : For if there be not already, in the nature of things, a fufticient Foundation ofReli- gion, it is nom too late ; for their courfe andorder cannot begin again. Nor is any thing, befides filch a Rer prefentation, needful : For have the Ad- ventures of daring Wits (as they are fond of being thought) alter'd the nature of things ? Or hath their nicer Breath thrown the World off from its ancient Bafis, and new-molded the U.. niverfe, fo as to make things be after the way of their own Hearts ? Or have they prevail'd upon themfelves, firmly to believe things are as they would with ? One would be afham'd to be of that fort of Creature, call'd MAN5 and count it an unfufferable Reproach to be long unrefolv'd, Whether there ought to befilch a thing in the World as Reli- gion, Y'ea, or No ? What ever came on't, or whatfoever I did, or did not, betides, I would drive this Bufinefs to an iffue5 I would never endure taike long in fufpence, about fo weiy and important a Quefiion a But if I inclin'd
iv A Preface. inclin'd to the negativeref , I would re in nothing Ihort of the plaineíf De- monftration : For I am to difpute againil Mankind! and Eternity hangs upon it ! If I misjudge, I run counter to the Common Sentiments of all the World, and I am loft for ever. The Oppofers of it havenothing but Incli- nation to oppofe to it, with a bold Jeff now and then. But if I confider the unrefuted Demonftrationsbrought for it, with the Confequencies, Religion is the laft thing in all the World upon which I would adventure to break a jeft. And I would ask fucb as have attempted to argue againft it: Have their ftrongeft Arguments conquer'd their Fear? Have they no Sufpicion left, that the other fide of the Quetti- on may prove true ? They have done all they can, by of- ten repeating their faint defpairing Wi(hes, and the Mutterings of their Hearts, no God! no God! to " make themfelves believe there is none ; when yet the reftlefs Tailings to and fro of their uneafy Minds; their tasking and t turing that little refidue of Wit and mon Senfe, which their Riot hath left them ( the excefr of which latter, as
?4 Preface. as well fhews as caufei the deferi of the former) to try every new Method and Scheme of Atheifnt they hear of, im- plys their Diftru(t of all, and their Su- fpicion, That do what they can, things willHillbe as they were ; i. e. molt ad- verfe and unfavourable to that Way of Living, which, however, at a ven- ture, they had before refolv'd on. Therefore, they find it necelfary to continue their Contrivances, howmore effe&wally to disburthen themfelves of any Obligation to be Religious ; and hope, at leak, fonse or other great Wit may reach further than their own ; and that either by force new Model of Thoughts, or by not thinking, it may be poflible, at length, to argue, or wink, the Deity into nothing, and all Religion out ofthe World. And we are really to do the Age that right, as to acknowledge, the Genius of it aimsat more Confiftency and A- greement with it felf, andmore clever- ly to reconcile ' Notions with common Practice, than heretofore. Men feem to be grownweary of theold dull way ofpraetifingall manner of Lewdneffes, andPretending to repent of them ; to Sin, and fay they are ferry for't. The running
vi A Preface. running this long-beaten circular Tract ofdoing, and repenting the fame things, looks ridiculously, and they begin to be alham'd on't. A lefs interrupted, and more progref ive Courfe in their Licentious Courfe, looks braver ; and they count it more plaufible to disbe- lieve this World to have any Ruler at all, than to fuppofe it to have fuck a One as they can cheat and mock with fo eafy and ludicrous a Repentance, or reconcile to their Wickednefs, only by calling themfelves wicked, while they Rill mean to continue fo. And per. haps of any other Repentance they have not heard much ; or if theyhave, they count it a more heroical, or feel it an eager thing, to laugh away the fear of any future Account, or Punifhment, than to endure the Severities of a feri- ous Repentance, and a regular Life. Nor can they, however, think the Torments of any Hell fo little tolerable as thofe of a fober and pious Life upon Earth. And for their happening to prove Everla{ling, they think they may run the hazard of that. For
A frerace For as they canmake a fafficient fhift to fecure themfelves from the latterfort of Torments, fo they believe theCham- pions of their Caufe have taken iufficient Care to fecure them from the fori' mere As Religion bath its Gofpel and P- vangeliris, fo bath Atheifm and Irre ligion too. There are Tidings ofPeace fent to fuch as [hall repent and turn to God: And there have been thofe ap . pointed, whole Bufinefs it flaould be, to publi[h and expound them to the World. This alto is the Method for carrying on the Defign of frr,:ligion D.,ctrines are invented o make Men fearlels, and believe they need no Re- pentance. Andf2mte have taken thepart to affert and defend fuch Doctrines, to evangelize the World, and cry Peace,, Peace.. to Men, upon tilde horrid Terms. And tìefe undertake for the common Herd, encourage them tò in- dulge themfelves all manner of Liber- ty, whiL they, watch for them, and guard the Coafts And no i- aith was ever more implicit or refign?d, than the Lafidefity and Disbelief is, of the more unthinking fort of thefe Mn They reckon it is Rot every One's part to A thin, ft0
viii A Preface. think. 'Tis enough for the mot} tobe boldly wicked, and credit their common Caufe, by an openContempt ofGod and Religion. The other warrant them fafe, and confidently tell them they mayfe- curely disbelieve all that ever hath been Paid, to makea religious regular Life be thought neceffary : As only invented Frauds, of four and ill- natured Men, that envy to Mankind the Felicity whereof their Nature hath made them capable, and which their own odd pre- ternatural Humour makes them neglea, and cenfure. And for there Defenders of the lithe- a real Caufe, it being their Part and Province to cut off the Aids of Reafon from Religion, to make it feem an irra., tional, and a ridiculous thing, and to warrant and jufiify* the difufe and con- tempt of it, and, as it were, to cover the Siege, wherewith the common Rout have begirt the Temple of God ; they have had lefs leafure themfelves, to debauch and wallow inmore groflyfenfuallmpu- rities. Herewith the thinking part did lefs agree : And they might perhaps count it a greater thing to make Deb bauchees than to be juch, and reckon 'twas Glory enough to them to head, and
Prefdce. lead on, the numerous Throng, and pleafureenough to fee them they had fo throughly difciplin'd to the Service, throw Dirt and Squibs at the faired Pile, theDwelling of God among Men on Earth, and cry down with it even to the Ground. Nor for this fort of Men, Whofe Bufinefs was only to be done by noife and clamour, or by jell and Laughter; we could think them no more fit to be difcours'd with than a Whirlwind, of an ignis fatuusa But for fuch as have affum'd to thenifelves the Confidence to pretend to Reafon, it was not fit they fhould have caufe to think them- felvss negle&ed. Confidering, therefore, that if the Exiience ofa Deity were fully prov'd . (i. e. fuch as muft be the fit Objea of Religion, or of the Honour ofa Temple) all the little Cavils agairiiff it muft fig- nifynothing, (becaufe the fame thing cannot be both true and falfe) we have in the former Part of this Diftourfe, en- dcavouur'd tri affert fo much in an Arm ementative way.
A Preface. And thereforefir.Fi laid down fuch Notion ofGod, as even Atheifs them- felves, while they deny him to exitt, cannotbut grant to be the true Notion of the thing they deny, viz. Summa- rily, that he can be no other than a Be- ing abfolrttely perfel. And thereupon 'next proceeded to evince the Exiftence of fuch a Being. And whereas this might have, been attempted in another Method, as was noted Part à. Ch. t. by concluding the Exifience of inch a Being frr.fl from the Idea ofit, which (as a Fundamental Perfeiion) involves ExiHence ; yea,and NeceJJty ofExifience, moll apparently in it. Becaufe that was clamour'd at as Sophiftical and Captious (tho' very firm unfliding Steps might, withCau- t A.s by tion, be taken in that way f) yet we the excel-rather chofe the other as plainer, more lent Dr.0 on, the mare more eafl ntelli i Crdorth, P f , y gi- in his In-ble and conviEtive, and lets liable to elleaZi Exception in any kind ; i. e. rather we find, begin at the bottom, and. arif from is done.' NeceJty of Exifience, to abfolute ! er- feCtion, than to begin at the top, and . prove downward, from abfolute Per- fection,. Neceff ty.ofFrienceo- Now
A Preface. x Now, If it do appear fromwhat bath beenfaid concerning the Nature of ne cefryfei exiflingBeing, that it cannot but be ab !nte!ly perfect, even as it is f ch, Once nothing is more evident than that fcnze Being or other doth exi.s` neceffariy, or of it felf, our Point is gain'd with- out more ado : i. e. We have anObject ofReligion, or one to whom a Temple duly belongs. We, thereupon, ufed fome Endeavor to make that good, and fecure that more compendious way to our End , as may be feen in theformer Part. Which was .endeavour'd, as it was a neerer and more expeditious courfe not that the main Caufe of Religion did depend Upon the immediate and felf-evident, reciprocal, Connection ofthe Terms, neceffary Exigence, and abfolute Perfection, as we {hall fee hereafter in the followingDifcourfe. ut becaufe there are other Hypothefes, t t proceed either upon the denial of any neceffary Being that is abfolutely per- fect, or upon the Afertion offorce necef, fary Being that is not abfolutely perfect , it hence appears requifite, to under- take the Examination of what is faid toeither of thefe Purpofes, andto {hew 3 , wits.
A Preface. with how little Pretence a necdlary moll perfe& Being is deny'd, or any fuch imperfect neceffary Being, is either aferted or imagined. We Mall, therefore, in this 2d. Part, Fir.1, take into Confideration what is ( with equal Abfurdity and Impiety ) afferted by, one Author, of the Identity of all Subliance, of the Impoffibility of one Subflance's being produc'd by another, And eoniequentlyof one neceffary f lf- exing Being, pretendedwith grofsfelf repugnancy, to be endued with infinite Perfections, but really reprefnted the common Receptacle of all imaginable Imperfection and Confufion. Next, what is afferted by another in avow'd oppofition to hint, of a neceffa- ry felf-exijient Being, that is at the fame time faid to be effntially imperfect. Then we fhall recapitulate what had been difcourfed in the former Part, for Proof of fuch a neceffariiy exifkent, andabfolutely perfect Being, as is there affected. Thencewe [hall proceed to thew how rea3ffnably Scripture Teflimmny is to be rcly'd upon,in reference to fome things concerning God', and the Religion of t Temple, which either are not fo fkarly
A Preface. xiii clearly detnonflrable, or not at all difco- verable, the rational Way. And laftly, thew how it hath come topats, if God be'itch as he bath been reprefented, fo capable of a Temple withMan, fo apt, and inclin'd to inha- bitfuch a One ; that he fbould ever not dofo ; or how fuch a Temple (hould e- ver ceafe, or be uninhabited, and defo- late, that the knownway of its Reflitu- tion may be the more regardable, and ma.avellous in our Eyes. TheAuthors againft whom we are tobe concern'd,are Benedittus Spinofa 7em, and anAnonymous French Writer, who pretends to confute him. And the better toprepare our way, we (hall go on to preface fomething concerning the former, viz.. Spinofa, whole Scheme t,thowith great pretence t As it is of Devotion, it acknowledges a Deity, laid boo yet fo confounds this krisfactitious Dei- in his Pofihm- t with every Sub antial Being in the Y . mou.c .8 . World betides 3 that upon the whole thick. it appears altogether inconfiftent with any rational Exercife or Sentiment of Religion at all. And, indeed, the weer pointing with the Finger, at the molt difcerni- ble,aud abfurdWeaknefs of fumeofhis A 4 principal
A Preface. true can be plainer, if by thefame At- tribute, or Nature, he means numeri- cally the fame 5 it only fignifies one thing is net another thing. But if he means there cannot be two things, or Subftan- ces, of the fame f ecial or general Na- ture, he bath his whole Bufnets yet to do, which how he does, we íha11- fee in time. But now compare herewith his De- finition of what he thinks fit to digni- fywith the Sacred Name of God, [ByDefniti God (faith he) I irnderfland a Being ab- 6° folutely infinite i. e. a Subflanceconffî- ing ofinfinite Attributes, every one where- ofexpr -f s an infinite Ffnce.] and be- hold the admirable Agreement ! how amicably his Definition ofanAttribute, and that mentioned Propftion accord with this Definition (as he calls it) of God! There cannot be two Subfantes, he faith, that have the fame Attribute, i. e. the fame Effence. But now it feems the fame Subfiance may have infinite Attri- butes, i. e. infinite Effences ! O yes, ve- ry conveniently : For, he tells you that two Attributes really dfina, we cannot Scholl. is conclude do conflitute two diversSubflan-Prop. ao., ego And why do they not ? Becaufe
A Preface. it belongs to the Nature ofSubfance, that each ofits Attributes be conceiv'd by it fell, &c. Let us confider his Affertion, andhis Reafon for it. He determines, you fee, two really diflinrJ Attributes do not con- flitute twodivers Subliances. Youmutt not here take any other Mens Notion of an Attribute, according to which, there may be accidental Attributes, that, we arefore, would not infer diverfity of Subliances for their SubjeEts ; or, there may be alfo effential Ones, that only flow from the Effence of the thing to which they belong; to, too, no Bo- dy doubts one thing may have many Properties. But we mutt take his own notion ofan Attribute, according where- to it conflisutes, or (which is all one) is, that very EUnce. Now will not fuch Attributes as thefe, being really diftintt, make di- vers Subftances ? Surely what things are efentially divers, muff be conclud- ed tobe moil divers. But thefe Attri- butes are by himfelf fuppofed to be re- ally dif inc` , and to confiiture (which is to be) the Effence of the Subítance. And how is that one thing, or one Sub® ance, which heitb Many E ences .? I thQ
Preface. xvii theEfence of t thing be that, by which it is what it %is, furely the Plurality of Epnees mat make a Plurality of things. But it may be faid, ` Cannot one thing be compoundedof two or more things effentially divers, as the Soul andBody of a Man ; whence, there- fore, thefame thing, viz. a Man, will have twoEffences ? This is true, but im- pertinel.xt. For the very notion of Com- pofition 'tìgnifies thefe are two things uni- ted, not identify'd, that are capable of being ?gain feparated 5 and that the third tching, which refults from them. both waited, contains themjtill dif Inc ` from, one another, not thefame. Bpt it may be faid, tho' thefe Attri- butes are acknowledg'd, and afferted to he diflinct from one another, they are yet found in one and the fame Sub- pance common to them all. And this no more ought to be reckon'd repug- nant to commonReafon, than the Pki lofophy heretofore in credit, which taught that the vaft diverliity of forms throughout heUniverfe, which were counted fo many difiini Eifences, do Yet all reticle in the fame firi7 Matter, as thecommaReceptacle of them all, Nor
itl A Preface. Nor yet cloth t is falve the Difnefs, were that P, lofopiy never fo ; : and facred. For you muft coal der lie af- ferns an Attribute is that which confli- tutes the Effence of the Subftance in which it is. But that Philofophy .ne- ver taught theforms lodg'd in the fame common Matter were its Fence, rho' they were fuppofed to efentiate the Compofita, which refulted from their Union therewith. Yea, it did teach theywere fo little the Effence of that common Matter, that they might be ex- Se11'd out of it, and fucceeded by new ones, and yet the Matter which 'recei- ved them (till remainthefame. But that an Attribute fhould be fuppofed to be the E nce ofthe Subfiance to which it belongs 5 and that another firperaddeci Attribute, which is alfo the Effence of Subftance, fhouldnot make another Sub- fiance effentially diftin&, is an Afferti- on as repugnant to common Se.nfe, as two and two make not four. But that which compleats the Jac (tho' a tre- mendous one upon fo awful a Subje&) is that this Author fhould fo gravely tell the World, they who are not of his Sentiment, being ignorant of the cps of things, confound al/ things
A Preface. xix imagine Trees and, Men f eaIing alike, Schol. 2. confóund the Divine Nature with then Prop. .Turane, &C. i , Part Who would imagine this to be the complaining Voice of one fo induftri oufly labouring tomingle Heaven and Earth ! and to make God, and Men, and Beaffs and Stones, and Trees all one and the fame individual Substance! And now let us confider the Rea- fon of that Afiertion of his; why taro Schol. in Attributes really difin ', do not col/Ili-Prop. la, tute tiro Beings, or two diftinel Subftan- ces ; becauf, faithhe, 'tis ofthe nature ofSubftance that each of its Attributes be conceived by itfelf, &c. A marvellous Reafon ! DiversAttributes,each where- of, as before, conIiitures theEffence of Substance, do not make.divers Subftan- ces; becaufe thofe Attributes may be conceiv'd apart from each other, and are not produced by one another. It was too plain to need a Proof, (as was obferved before) that there cannot be two Subftances ofone Attribute, or of one Effence, (as his Notion of an At- tribute is) io e. two are not one. But that twoAttributes or Effences ofSub- fiance, cannot make two Subftances, becaufe they are divers, is very furpri- fingl ,
cx A Preface. fingly orange. Th is was (as Cicero upon asgood an Oo cation fpeaks) not to confider, but cal .Lots what to fay. And it deferves Obfervation too, howwell this A%rt.ion, [That two di- flinUAttributes do not conftitute twodi- ftint Subftances,] agrees with that, Prop. 2: [Two Subftances Ti, axing divers Attri- butes, have nothiA -g common between them.] This muf E certainly fuppofe the Diverfity of Attributes tomake the greateft Diverfity cifSuboances imagin- able ; when they admit not there fhould be any tbing ( not the leaft thing?) common. between them ! And yet they make not diftinú Subítances ! But this was only to make way for what was to follow, the Overthrow of the Creation. 1A thing he was fo over- intent upon, that in the heat of his Zeal and Haft, he makes all fly afun- der before him, and overturns even his own Batteries as fait as he raifes them, Pays and unfays, does and un- does, at all Adventures. Here two Subftances are fuppofed havinggdioiric1 Attributes, that is, dittin&t Effences, to have therefore nothing etìrnmon be- tween them ; and , yet prefently after, thy' two, or never fo many diflin& Atttrib tet,
A Preface. Attributes, give unto Subftance two, or never fo many diftin& Effences, yet they fhall notbe fo much a s two,butone, only. For to the Query put by himfelf, By what Sign one may dfcern the diver- Schol, in flyofSuldtances ? he roundly anfwers, Prop. io. The following Propofitions would chew there was no other Subftance but one, and that one infinite, and therefore how Sub- fiances were to be diver/ify%dwould be en. quired in vain. Indeed, it would be in vain, ifknowing them tohave dif- ferent Effences, we mutt not yet call them different Subftances. But how the following Propofitions do thew there can be no more than one Sub. fiance, we fhall fee in time. We fhall for the prefent take leave of him, 'till we meet him again in the following DISCO7JRSE.
Errata. Pag. Lire. vi 6. TN the Preface, for Cour/'e, r. Waies. 10 23. r. Plenitude. 19 14. r. whence. 45 30. r. Hypothefet. ff 54 30. r. Subience. 97 Marg. r ffrangeft. III 26. r. known. Marg. r. drrvoiaf. 114 Marg. r. Cebetis. 153 12. r. accommodatenefs 155 2. r. as it was. 3. dele it. 272 i. T. acutely. 192 6. for if, r. of. 212 17. r. meeknefs. 214 23. r. great Name. 25. r. bath, we fee. 28. for bis, r. this, 215 21. r. Fountain. 220 30. r. that modefty. 233 18. r. than. 235 13 r. more. 236 29. r. were an imagi- nation. 245 19. r. extenfive. 258 18. r. Bannithment. Pag. Lin. 281 15. r. became. 295 20. for as, r. i. C. 301 13. r. permanent. 3r6 i. r. [carol. 2. for mercifully, read more fitly. 25. r. abundant. 31g 29, 30. r. if the guilt of theformer Apoflates. 322 6. for your, r. their. 34o io r. manner of. 342 I. r.Omniprefent. 360 23. for but, r. be. 2 r, forth ; 403 Marg r. entmTemplurs 411 5: r. produaive. 413 7. r. promifed. 417 Marg. r. ,id)aczrdsea 423 y3. r. more. 426 30. r. they. 429 Marg. dele Con. 439 9. dele lie. 454 21. dele with. 456 16. r. doing it 46o a6. r. Pinnacles. 463 Marg. r. lfidora Peltft 466 126 r. uaAIT7/v eicti
THE Living Temple. PART II. CHAP. I, Wherein k fbewn the Defirgaiveneft of Spinofds Scheme and Defign to Religi- on, and the Temple of God. The Repugnancyof his Doctrine to this Af- fertion [that whatfoever exifts necef- farily, and of it felf, is abfolutely perfea] which is thereforefurther weigh- ed. His vain Attempt to prove what he defigns. His 2d. Propojition confidered. His Definitionof a Sulgance Defedive. Proves not his Purpofe. His 3d, 4th, and 5th Propofltion. His 8th. Scholia The Manududio ad Pantofophiam. H ITHERTO we have difcourfed only ofthe Owner of this Temple; and thewn to whom it rightfully belongs, that there is one, only, neceffiwy,filf7
The Living Temple. Part H. exiging, and moil abfolutely perfect Be- ing, the glorioras and ever-blefd God, who is capable of ourconverfe, and in- clin'd thereto whom we are to conceive as juftly claiming a Temple with us, and ready, p n o_rr` willing furrender,' to ere hi4s, or repair fuch a one, make it habitable, to inhabit and replenith it with his holy, and rnoft deleecablè pre- fence, and convetfe with us therein fuita- bly,to .himfelf, and us ; i. e. to his own Excellency, and Fulnef ; and to our Indi- gcncy, and Wretchednefc. And now the Order of Difcourfe would lead us to behold the Sacred Stras- Unre`rifing, and view thefurprizing Me- t4ods by which it is brought about, that any fuch thing fhoLld have place in fuch a <<Vcrld as this But we mutt yield to flay, and be de- tain'd a Little by fome things of greater Importance, than meerly the more even Shape, and Order of a Difcourfe ; that is, lookinghack upon what bath been much inf feedon in the Farmer Part, [thatfome Being or other loth exi(l neceffarily, and of it [elf, which is o fabfolute or univerfal Per feCfion 51 and taking notice of tie oppo- lite Sentiments offome hereto becaufe the whole deign of evincing an Objet ofReligion, would manifeilly be much ktved
Part II. The Living Temple. ferved hereby, we could not but reckon it of great Importance to confider what is fail again fi it. We have obferv'd in the Preface a two- fold oppofite Hypothefis, which there- fore, before we go further in the Dif- courfe of this Temple of God, require to be difcufs'd. The Firfi is that ofSpinofa, which he bath more ezprefly ftated, and underta- ken with great Pomp, and Boaft, to de- monfirate in his Pot hJumous Ethicks, which we fhali therefore fo far confider, as Both concern our prefent Defign. He there, as bath been noted in the Preface, afferts all Subflance to be felf-exie lent, and to be infinite, that one Sub- (lance is improducible by another, that there is but One, and this One he calls God, lac. Now this horridScheme of his, tho' he and his Followers would cheat the World withNames, andwith a fpecious Shew ofPiety, is as dire tly levell'd a- gainft all Religion, as any the molt" a- vowedAtheifn,. For, as to Religion, it is all one whether we make nothing to be God, or every thing, whether we allow of no God to be worthípped, or ` leave none to worship him. His portentous li.trempt.: to identify and deify all Sub. fiance,
4 The Living Temple. Part II. fiance, attended with that ftrange pair of Attributes, Extenfton and Thought (and an infinite number of others betides) bath a rnanifeft defign to throwReligion out of theWorld that way. And it molt direly oppofes the notion of a Self-exfient Being, which is abfoltttely perfec7. For fuck a Being muft be a Subftance, if it be any thing ; and he allows no Subftance but One, and therefore none to be Perfea, unlefs all be fo. And fence we are Pure force it Imperfect, it will be confequent there is none abfolutely Perfect. For that the fame Ihould be imperfea, and abfolutely Per- felt, is impoflible. Betides that he makes it no way pofii. We to one Sitbfiance to produce another, and what is fo impotent, muft be very im- perfect. Yea, and whatfoever is not om- nipotent, is evidently not abfolutelyPer- fect. We are therefore caft upon reconfider- ing this Propofition. [Whatfoever Being exifis neceffarily, andof it felfis abfolutely 1erfelll.] It is true that if any Being be evinced to exift neceffarily, and of it felf, which is abfolutely PerfeCt, this gives us an Ob- ject of Religion, and throws Spinofa's Farrago, his confuted Heap and jumble of Selifexiftent Being into nothing. 134 ìI.
Part II, The LivingTemple.- But if we carry the univerfal Prop* tion, as it is laid down, tho that will oblige us afterwards, as well to confute his FrenchConfuter, as him it carries the Caufe ofReligion withmuch the greater, Clearnefs, and with evident unexception- able Self-confifency. For, indeed, that Being cannot be underftood to be abfo- lutely Perfe&, which doth not eminently comprehend the entire Fulnefs of all Be- ing in it felf; as that mull be an heap of Imperfe&ion, an everlaíting Chaos, an impofiible Self-repugnant Medley, that fhould be pretended to contain all the Varieties, the Diverfifications, Compo- fitions and Mixtures ofthings in it felf formally. And for the univerfal Propofí'tion : The matter it felf requires not an immediate, felf-evident, reciprocal Connexion of the Terms necefarilyfelf-exifleet, and ab- folutely perfect. It is enough that it how- ever be brought about by gradual Steps, in a way that, at length, cannot fail and I conceive, bath been, in the Method, that was follow'd in the Former Part. For, to bring the Bufinefs now within as narrow a compafs, as is poffible. No- thing is more evident than that force Be- ing ex f s neceffirily, or of it felf; other- wife nothing at all could now exift. A- B 3 gain,
The Living Temple. Part II. gain, for the fame Reafon, there is fome neceffary, or felf-exiftent Being that is the Caufe of whatfoever Being exitr not of itfelf; otherwife nothing of that land; could ever come intoBeing. Now that neceffary Being, which is the Caufe of all other Being, will moll mani- feflly appear to be abfolutely Perfe&. For, if it be univerfally Caufative of all other Being, it muff both havebeen the aetual Caufe of all Being that doth aCtu- ally exifi and can ,only be the pofJrble Caufe of all thafis poff ble to ex /. Now fo univerfal a Cauf can be no other than an abflately or univerfally perfeC'Being. For it could be the caufe of nothing, which it did not vertually, or formally comprehend in it felf. And that Being, which comprehends in it felf all Peferiion, Loth actual and pofble, mull be abfolutely, or univerfally Perfects And fuch a Being, as hash allo further, More particularly been made apparent., mutt be an intelligent, and a defigning A- gent, or Cauf . Becaufe, upon the whole Univerfe of produced Beings, there are molt manifeft Charmers of 1Defign in the pal ave Sesfe ; i. e. of their having been dined to ferve Ends, to which they have fodireec, and conftant, an Aptitude, as that the Attempt to make it be believ'd, they
Part II. ilkLivingTemple. they were fó'rc'd; or fell, into that'pofture ofSubferviency to fùch and fuch Ends by any pretended Neu fiity Upon their Prin- cipal Cagle o Caajes, or by sneer tafiaalty, looks like the naafi ludicrous Trilling to any ManofSenfe 5 but al fo becaufe that da mongproduced Beings there are`'found to be many, that are themfelvesactively dé-` fagning, & that do`underf an"dingly intend.,, and purfue ends'; and eonfequently that` they"thenafelvés muff partake of ah lntelli gent, Spiritual Nature (fîncegmeer matter- is molt tnariifeftly u capàble of T 6ught or Deign). And further, by the n611 evi dent Confequence, that their prodaiaive' Caufe, viz,. the neceffary,fe f ex f lingBeing,' whereto all other things owe themfelves,° muff be a Mind or Spirit; inafmuch as to fuppofe any effect to have any thingmore of Excellency in it, than the Caufe from whence it proceeded, is to fuppofe all that Excellency to be effefted without a Caufe, or to have arifen of it felf out of nothing. Seeformer Part, Chap. T 2. &c. Therefore if it did not immediately appear that neceffary Being, asfilch, is ab- folutely perfect Being. Yet, by this Series of Difcourfe, it appears the main Canfe of Religion is ítill fafe, inafmuch as that zeceffary Bring, which is the Canfe of dl B 4 thing:
8 The Living Temple. t'art Yte things elfe, is however, evinced to be an abfolutely perfect Being, And particular- ly, a neceffaryfelfexRent Mind or Spiriti which is therefore, a moft apparently fit, and mofl deferving Object of Religion, or of the Honour of a Temple, which is the Sum of what we were concern'd for. Nor needed we be folicitous; but that theVnity, or Onlinefs, of the necefary Beingwould, afterwards, be madeappear, as alfo we think it was. For fince the whole 2iniverfe ofpro-, cluced Being, muff arife out of that which Was neceffary felf- exiflent Being, it mutt therefore comprehend all Being in itfelf, its own, formàlly,azld eminently, alÍother, i, e. what was its own, being formally its own, nmfì be eminentir alfo all Being el,cóntain'd in allpoffible iniplicity,with in the Productive Power ofits own. This Being therefore, containing; in it Leif, all that exi/ls neceffarily, with the Power of producing all the refs which, together, make up all Bei;,, can primarily be but One, inafmuch as there_can be but One All. Upon the whole therefore, our gene- ral Propojition is fufficiently evident, and but ofqueftion, That [Whatever exifl.s neceffarily, and of it f lf, is abfolutely Per- fei. Nor
Part Ì. lJe Living Temple. Nor is it at all Incongruous, that this Matter fhouldbe thus argued out by fuch. a `Frain, and Deduflion of C;onfetiuen- ces, drawn fromEffeds, that come under our prefent Notice : For how come we to know that there is any felf -exzfing Being at all, but that we find there is fómewhat in Being that is Abject to con- tinual Mutation, and which therefore exifls not neceffarily (for whatfoever is what it is neceffarily, can never change, or be other than what it is) but mutt be caufed by that, which is Neceffary and Self-exiftent. Nothing could be more reafonable, or more certain, than the Deduaion from what appears of Excel- lency and Perfeftion in filch Being as is caufed, of the Correfpondent, and far Tranfcendent, Excellency, and Perfali$ on of its Caufe. But yet, after all this, ifone fet hitn-. felf attentively to confider, there .muff appear fo near a Connexion between the very things themfelves, .Self-exiflence, and abfolute Perfection, that it can be no eafy matter to conceive them feparately. Self- exiflence ! Into how profound an Abyfs is a Man call at the thought of it ! How doth it overwhelm, and fwal- low up his Mind, and wholeSoul ! With what Satisfaction and Delight, niufl he fce
io The Living Temple. Part If. himfelf comprehended, ofwhat he finds he can never comprehend! For contem- plating the f lf-exiflent Being, he finds it eternally, neceffarily, never-not exifl- ing ! He can have no thought of the es Cart.; fe1 f-exifling Being, as filch, but as always exifling, as having exifted always, as al- ways certain to exifl. Enquiring into the Spring and Source of this Beings ex- fience, whence is it that it Both exifl ? His own Notion of a felf-exifling Being, which is not arbitrarily taken up, but which the reafon of things hath impos'd upon him, gives him his Anfwer, and it canbe no other, in that it isafelf-exflent Being, it hath it of it fell; that it loth exit}. It is an eternal, everlafling pring and Fountain ofperpetually ex fleet Be- ing to it felf. What a giorious Excellen- cy ofBeing is this ! What can this mean, but the greateft' remotenefs from nothing that is poflible 5 i. e. the moll" abfolute: Ful tiers, andPlentitude ofall Being, and Perfdlion ? And whereas all caufed Being, as finch, is, to every Man's Underftanding, con- find within certain limits 5 what can the uncaufedSelf exiftent Beingbe, but moll unlimited, infinite, all -comprehending, and moil abfolutely perfea ? Nothing
Part II. The Living Temple. I r Nothing, therefore, can be more evi- dent, than that the Selfexigent Being muft be the abfolutely perfect Being. Andagain, if you fin)ply convert the Terms, and let this' be the Propofition,. that [t /re abfolutely perfeel Being, is the Self-ex(lent Being]`'tis moft obvious to every one, that the very Notion of an àbfolntety perféd Being, carries neceffity of Exiftence or Seif-Exiftence in it, which the Notion of nothingelfe dotli. And, indeed, one great Adafiler of this Argument, for the Exiftence of God, Dr.More pathhimfelf told me,. Ihàt tho, when he had puzzl ,;l ' piers iltheifis with it,, they had beenwont t qua °rel at it, as Sophifli- cal, and Fallacious, he could never meet with any that could detc t the Sophifn, or tell where any Fallacy in it lay and that, upon' thewhole, he rely'dupon it, as moil folid and firm. And, I doubt not, but it may be manag'd with that Advantage, as to be very clearly concluding; yet, be- caufe I reckon'd the way I have taken more clear, I chofe it rather : But, find- ing that fo near Cognation, and recipro- cal Conne&ion, between the terms both ways, I reckon'd this fhort Reprefentati- on hereof, annexed to the larger Courfe ofevincing the fame thing, might add no unufeful Strength to it. And doubt not
2 The Living Temple. Part II. not to conclude, upon the whole, that IVhatfoever Being exifis neceffarily, and of it felf, is abfolutely perfeci] and can, therefore, be no other than an intelligent Being; i. e. an infinite, eternal Mind ,and fo a molt fit, and the only fit deferving Obje&ofReligion, or of the Honour of a Temple. III. But now, be all this never foplain, it will, by fome, be thought all falle, if they find any Man to have Contrivance enough to devife fome contraryScheme of things, and Confidence enough to pretend to prove it, 'till that Proof be deteóed of Weaknefs, and Vanity, which muff jàr.ri be our further Bufinefs with Spi- nofa. And not intending to examine parti- cularly the feveral Parts, and Junctures of his Model, inafmuch as I find his whole Defign is loft, if he fail of evin- cingthefe things, That it belongs to all Subfiance, as finch, to exiil of it felf, and be infinite ; And (which will he fufficiently confequent hereupon) that Sub- fiance is Ina one, and that 'tis impof tble for one Sid fiance to produce another rs
Part IL The Living Temple. I 3 I {hall only attend to what he more direr tly lays to this effect ; and {hall particularly apply my felf to confider filch of his Propofrtions, as more immedi- ately refpeEt this his main Defgn ; For they will bring us back to the Definitions, and Axioms, or other parts of his Dif- courfe, whereon thofe are grounded, and even into all the darker and more perni- cious Receffes of his Labyrinth, fo as every thing ofImportance to the menti- on'd purpofe, will be drawn under our Confideration, as this thread {hall lead us. His i ít. Propofition we let pals, [That a Subftance is, in order of Nature, before its Affections] having nothing applicable to his Purpofe in it, which we thall not otherwife meet with. His 2d. [That two Subfiances, having divers Attributes, have nothing common between them] or, whichmutt be all one, do agree in nothing, I conceive it will be no great Prefumption to deny. And fincehe is pleafed herein, to be divided from bimfelf, it is a Civility to his later, and wifer-felf, to do fo, who will, after- wards, have Subftance, having a multi- tude of diftin& Attributes, (i. e. Effen- ces) and which, therefore, cannot but beSchol. manifold, to have every thing Comi Prop, to $non.
The Living Temple. Part IL mon. (So little bath he Common with And 'twill increafe theObligation up-. on him, to deliverhim from theEntan- glement of his Demonfiration, as he calls it, of thiS Propofition, as I hope we fhall alfo of the other too 5 for, no doubt, they are both falfe. Of this Propofition his Dernonftration is fetcht from his 3d. Definition, viz. of a Subftance, [That which is hi itfilf; and conceived by itfilf; i. e. whofe Conception needs the conception ofnothing elf e,whereby it ought to beform'ol] fo is his Definition defined over and over. We are here to enquire : i. Into his Definitionof a Subflance. 2. Whether it fufEciently prove his Propofition. iv ifì. For his Definition ofa Subfrance. He himfelf tells us, ADefinition ought to Schol . 0 0 in exprefi nothing, but thefimple Nature °fax Prop.. thing dejin , d and we may as well ex- pest it diftindly to exprefs that. Doth this Definition exprefs the Pimple Na- ture of a Subftance ? [that which is in it- felf] when 'tis left to Divination, what is meant by is, whether fifince, or Exi- fieace
Part IL The Living Temple. 15 ftence, or Stibfftence ? And when we are to be as random a Guefs, what is in- tended by being in itfelf? Whether be- ing only contain'd, or being alfo fu-. itain'd in, and by, or of itfelf ? And fuppofing this later to be meant, whe- ther that Self-Subfiftence exclude Depen- dence only on mother, as a Subject, which we acknowledge true of all Sub- fiance ; or Dependence as on anefficient 9 which if he will have to be taken for true of all, he was in reafon to expec` it íhould be fo taken from his effeaual Proof, not from the Reverence of his Authority only : For what he adds, [And that is conceived by itfelf; and whole Conception needs not the Conception of any other thing, by which it ought to beform'd] Would he have us believe this to be true, when, afterward, his loth Propo- fition is, [That every Attribute ofSubftance ought to be conceived by itfelf?]Whereupon then fo many Attributes, fo many Sub- fiances, it being the Nature of a Sub- fiance to be conceived by itfelf. But, palling from his Notion of a Sub- flame, let us confider, 2dly, How it proves hisPropofition, that two Subfan- ces, having different Attributes, have no- thing Common between, then!. According tohim, every AttributeofSubftance is to be Vp
x 3 The Living temple. Part II, be conceiv'd by itfelf ; and yet have one and the fame Subftance common to them all. Therefore, thediftinaConception of things is even with him, no reafon, why they Ihould have nothing common between them. But, its to the thing itfif he muff have fomewhat more enforcing than his Defi- nition ofa Subftance, to prove that two (or many) individual Subftances may not have the fame fpecial Nature common to them, and yet be conceiv'd by them- felves ; having different individual Na, tures, or Attributes; or different fpecial Nature r, having the famegeneral Nature. Yea, and an equal dependence on the fame Common Caufe, which is left gredient into the Conception of a thing, than thegeneral orfpecial Nature is. And, I doubt not, we (hall find he bath not difprov'd, but that there is fomewhat, in a true fenfe, common to them, and their Garrfe, that is of a Conception much more vailly different from them both. Whereupon, it is unneceffary to take diftinct Notice of his 3d. Propoliition, [What things have nothing common between then,, oftbem the one, cannot he the Caufe ofthe other] In which nothing is to be peculiarly animadverted on, betides the Contradifion in the very Terms, where-
Part II. The Living Te smile. in it is propos'd, What Things have no- thing Common between them ; How can they be Things, and have nothing Com- mon between them ? If they be Things, they have fure the general Notion of Thing Common to them. There can, therefore, be no fuch Things, that have nothitag Common. And let this be fuppo- fed, to have been abfurdly fet down on purpofe. Yet now for his Demonfira_, Lion hereof, it refts upon a palpable Falf /hood ; that Carafes, and EfeCts, muff be mutually under(iood by one another, as we thall fee more hereafter. His 4.th, we let pars ; what it bath regardable in it, being, as fitly, to be confider'd under the 5th. [There cannot be two, or more, &lb- VI,. fiances, in the whole Zlniverf of thefame Nature, or Attribute] unto which, be- fides what hath been Paid already, we need only, here, to add, that (whereas he hath told us, by the Attribute ofa Sub- fiance, he means, the Effence of it) if he here fpeak of the fame numerical Ence, or Attribute, 'tis ridiculoufly true; and is no more than ifhe had fail, One Thing, is but One Thing : If he fpeak of the fame f ecial, or general Attribute, or El:- fence, 'tis as abfurdly falfe. And, for the Proof of it, in the latter Senfe, his De- pion ration 7
The Living Temple. Part II. nronflration fignifies nothing. There may be more than one (as a Stone, a Tree, an Animal) that agree in the fame gene- ral Attribute of Corporeity, and are diver - fify'd by their fpecial Attributes ; and there may be many ot, the famefpecial At- tribute, (viz, of Rationality) as John, Peter, and Thomas, &c. that are dittin- guiiht by their individual ones. He might as well prove, by thefame Method, the Identity of his Modi, as of Suhfan- ces ; as that there can be but one indivi- dual Triangle, in all the World, of one Attribute, or Property, as but one Subs- fiance. Let (for inftance) one at Paris, another at Vienna, a third at Rome, a fourth at London, defcribe each an Equi- lateral Triangle of the fame Dimenfions, or in a thoufand Places betides; each one of thefe do only make one, and the fame, numerical Triangle, becaufe they have each the fame Attribute. But how are theAttributes of thefefeveral Triangles, the fame ? What ! the fame numerically? Then, indeed, they are all the fame nu merical Triangle : For one, and the fame numerical Effence, makes but one and the farne,numerical Thing.. But who, that is in his right Wits, would fay fo? And if it be only fail, they have all Attributes of one and the fame kind, what then is Confequent,
Part IL The Livino; Temple.' Confequent, but that they ate all Ti- angles of one kind ? Which who, in his right Wits, will deny ? And, if the At- tribute of a Subfiance be that,. which confii- f i itdes its Una 5 the Attribute of any thing elfe, is that which conftitutes its Effence. See then how far Spinofit hath advanced with his Demonfiration of the Identityof Suyiance! Ifhe prove not all Subflance to he numerically the fiime, he bath done nothing to his purpofe. And 'tis now cbvious to every Eye how effe- th-dIy he hath done that. When alto it is, further, equally evi- dent,, his Demonftration dwindles into nothing. And gives nòSupport to His 6[11. Propojition (which contains the malignity of his whole Defign) viz. [That one Alliance cannot be prcduc'd, by another Subflancell which tefts (as you lee) partly upon the 5th. [That there can- not be two Subflances ofthe fame Attribute] which, in his Senfe, is, as hath been {hewn, mof abfurdly Falle, and the at- tempt of proving it as abfUrd s partly upon his 2d. [rhat two Subflances, of different Attributes, have vothingCommen between them] which might be laid of whatfOever elfi as truly as of Snbfiances but which is alfo mof evidentlyuntrue - and partly, upon his 3d. [That ,fild' C 2 t.:.);77gi 9
2o The Living Temple. Part II. things as have nothing Common between then,, the one ofthem cannot be the -cattfe of the other] which depends upon two LifeSuppofitions, r. [l hat there can be tiro things, which have nothing Common between them] ; which, as hash beenno- ted, conntPadicls itfel and needs not be further flood upon. 2. [That whatfoc- ver l burgs are (aufe and Lffécf, the one to the other, nm& be mutually underftood iy one another] which we fhall'here more ditlin6tly confider, it being allo his 2d. Demon ftration of the Corollary of this his 6th. Propofition (which nothing but a Difpofition toTrifle, or having nothing to lay, ' could have made him mention, as a Corollary from this Propo//tion, it be- ing, in e$é&, but a Repetition of the fame thing) viz. [That if one Subflance can be produc'd by another (Agent, or Sub- fiance, which you pleafe) the Knowledge of it miufi depend upon the Knowledge of its Cauf (by the4th. Axiom) and thereupon (by De..n. 3d.) it Mould not be a Sub- fiance.] We are here to confider, Ill. This his 4th. Axiom, [That the Knowledge ofan Effeíl, depends upon the Knowledge of its Caufe, and doth involve it.] An Effeel may be confider'd two ways, ".Abfolutely, as it is in it felt, or Re- latively, as it is the efec of an Efcient Caufi.
Part II. The Living Temple. 2 i Caufe. It cannot, 'tis true, be under- flood to be the efee of filch an Efficient, but the Knowledge that this was it.; Efi- eient, is involv'd therein for 'tis the fame thing, and fo much may be known, without knowing any thing of the Na- ture, of either the Efficient or Efee. But this fignifies nothing to his Pur- pofe. He mull, therefore, mean, that the Knowledge of an Effect, abfolutely con- fided, and in its own Nature, depends upon, and involves, the Knowledge of theNature of its Efficient. Surely, the Nature ofa thing may be competently known by its true Definition. But is theEfficient Caufe, wont to be uni- verfallyput intoDefinitions ? He tells us himfelf (Schol. 2. upon Propofition 8.) A true Definition contains, or expreffes, nothing, befdes the nneer Nature of the thing defined. And let any Man, that thinks it worth it, be at the Pains, toex- amine his own Definitions in the feveral Parts of this Ethico-Geometrical Trae, and fee whether he always puts the Ef- ficient Cat f into every Definition. And (no doubt) he thought himfelf to De- fine accurately. If all other Men, who have fo generally reckon'd the Efficient and End, External Caufs, andonly Mat- C3 ter
22 The Li'inó 'Temple. Part II. ter and Form Internal, and ingredient in- to the Nature Of Things, and therefore Only pit to be put intoDefinitions, were thought' y him miitaken, and out in their Reckoning, it was, however, nei- ther modal, nor wife, tQ lay down, for anAxiom, a thing fo contrary to the Còmmon Sentiment of Pviankind; and, without the leaft Attempt to prove it, go about to dernonfrate by it, in fo por- tentozi' a Cauf ; and lay the whole weight of his horridCaufe upon it; ex- ' pe&ing all the World fhould'" be aye d. in- to an Affent, by the Authority of his bare word ; and not prefunie to disbe- lieve, or doubt it, only Lecaufe he is pleafed to ftamp theMagifferial Nan)e of an Axiom upon it If, therefore, any Man affume the Bold_nefs to deny his Ax- iom, what is become of his De, onfrati- òn ? And whereas it is commonly appre- hended,' that Definitions are net of .indi- tiidual Things, but of Special Kinds, and Prop. aq is atknovledg'd by him eif, 1 hat the Effinceof things produc'd by God, involves not Exifente " and the Production of a thing, Li nothing elf , but the putting it in- to anal Exiflence ; why may not the abfiraCtiTenCe, or Nature of things, he Well enoúgh conceiv'd , and defin'd, widheut involving the Conception of their Pro-
Part II. The Living Temple. 23 ProduElive Caufe ;' And this enough (hews, 2dly, That his Definition of a Subflance proves not, that one Subfiance cannot be produc'd by another : Viz. [That which can be conceived by it fell] for fo it may, without involving the Conception; of that which produces it ; and -robe a Sub fiance fufficiently according to his Defini- tion. Tho' there can be no Inconveni- ence in admitting that things underftood, apart, by themselves 5 may be, after- wards, further, and more clearly under- ftood, by confìdering, and comparing, them in the Habitudes, and References, which they bare as Caufès, and Effeas, (or'otherwife) to one another. And now is his 7th. Propofition, [That it belongs to VIII. the Nature of Sulfiance to exifl.] Which is fo great a Pillar, left it felf without Support : And being underflood of Sub- flance asfilch, as his Terms, and Defivn, require it to be, it is manifestly irrpioirr, communicating the moft fisndanlental At- tribute ofthe Deity, to all Subflance.- And it is as little befriended by Reafon; as it befriends Religion; for itrefts upon no thing, but the foregoing, baffled Propfa- lion; and this Definition, of that which is Def. 5: its own Caufe ; which is, [That whofe Ef- fence involves Exiflence, or which cannot C 4 be
24 The Living Temple. Part IL be conceived otherroife than as exifting] whereas, it is fufficiently plain, we have a Conception clear enough of the general Nature of a Subftance as fuch, abftraded from Exiftence, or Non-Exiftence, con- ceiving it only to be filch, as if it exiff, Both fubfift in, and by it felt, i. e. with- out having a SubjeE to fupport it; tho' it may befuch, as to have needed a Pro- tht ive, and continually to need a fit- ftaining efficient Caufe. Nor is there lefs Clearnefs in this abftrac`l Conception ofa Subftance, than there is in that of a Mo- ttos, or Accident, which we may con- ceive in an equal Abftraction, from actual Exiftence, or Non-Exit once; underffan- ding it to befuch, as that, if it exist, it doth inexifl or exi Pc only in another. And now is our Way fufficiently pre- pared to the Confideration of his 8th. Pcopofition. LThat all Subftance is necejtrily infinite]. And how is it dernon[trated ? Why, by his 5th. Prop. [That there can be but one Subftance, ofone and thefame Attribute,] which hath been fufficiently raveil'd and expos'd ; fo as not to be left capable of fignifying any thing here, as the Reader will fee by looking back to what bath been faid up- on it. And now it muff quite fink, its W cab RdslancC failing ltd viz. the foregoing 7t% A
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